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From the Editor
We have a snide saying in the United States: Those who can, do; those who 
can’t, teach. It’s nonsense, of course, probably made up by someone who wasn’t a 
good student. 
I’d like, however, to offer a variation of that saying: Those who can, do; those 
who can’t, destroy. People who believe they must burn down the world so a 
version that suits their ideals can rise in its place aren’t actually going to create, 
build, or nurture anything. More than 100 years ago, anarchists ran around 
blowing people up so a government-free paradise could magically emerge. 
Left-wing terrorism tore cars, children, and neighborhoods apart in the 1960s 
and 1970s, with the aim to replace bourgeois capitalist values with benevolent 
socialist ones. Now religious extremists in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe 
are trying yet again to use violence to usher in a fantastical paradise that will exist 
nowhere but in their own fevered dreams. Destruction is quick and easy. Three-
year-olds are really good at it. Creating and planning, building and nurturing 
take patience, knowledge, skill, time, and a lot of hard work. The people who 
devote themselves to death and destruction aren’t going to build paradise, now 
or ever. They don’t have what it takes. Because they can’t do, they destroy.
Fortunately, the rest of the world is still full of creativity. We are pleased to begin 
this issue with a photo essay by veteran photojournalist Robert Nickelsberg. He 
presents black-and-white and color portraits of people we would otherwise never 
see: Afghan women who have lost their husbands to violence and who now 
struggle to survive and raise their children in a country that makes no place for 
them. The struggle to foster peace and rebuild communities in Afghanistan can 
seem endless. One of the most important and difficult tasks in the fight against 
the Taliban has been to build up indigenous security and police forces that can 
operate effectively in cooperation with a nascent legal system. Major Birger 
Soerensen describes how one Danish task force accomplished this work despite 
both predictable obstacles and unexpected diversions.
Following this, Lieutenant Colonel Sylvester Perera, who wrote about his experi-
ence fighting the Tamil Tiger insurgency in Sri Lanka for the November 2015 
issue of CTX, returns with a thoughtful look at the Sri Lankan army’s role in the 
process of rebuilding infrastructure, livelihoods, and most importantly, trust in 
the aftermath of civil conflict.
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Next, Dr. Chris Harmon notes that some Western news media seem reluctant to apply the word terrorist to the violent 
Islamist groups that are attacking targets across the Middle East and in Europe, for fear of appearing chauvinistic. 
Dr. Harmon shows us that anarchists and insurgents have embraced the label of terrorist for more than a century and 
suggests that, when we avoid applying it where it belongs today, we only help empower the killers. In the last of our feature 
articles, Dr. John Arquilla tells a ghost story intended to frighten anyone who thinks seriously about strategy. He raises 
three specters who, he argues, continue to haunt strategists and misguide decision making long after they should have been 
laid to rest.
For the CTAP interview, Africa specialists Dr. Letitia Lawson and Colonel Michael Mensch talked with Nick Tomb about 
security, counterterrorism, and prospects for the future across Africa’s diverse nations and regions. This is an “extremely 
big question” as Dr. Lawson notes, about “an extremely big continent going in many different directions.” Finally, ethicist 
George Lober takes us back to 1975 and the final days of the Vietnam War to ponder the question, Do you hold any 
principles you believe are worth fighting for, whatever the cost? As he tells us, one man was put to the test in Saigon and 
still wrestles with his decision, 40 years later.
Be sure to check out the latest essays from JSOU in our publications announcements.
We welcome your feedback, criticism, and suggestions regarding anything you read in CTX. Write to us at CTXEditor@
GlobalECCO.org. You can send your essays, artwork, and movie and book reviews for possible publication to CTX-
Submit@GlobalECCO.org. 
Remember, we’re here because you’re there, and we depend on you, the global counterterrorism community, to be both our 
readers and our contributors. Keep up the good work, and stay in touch.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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Dr. John Arquilla is a professor and the chair of the Department of 
Defense Analysis (DA) at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). His 
research interests extend from explorations of the history of irregular 
warfare to studies of the complex strategic implications of the informa-
tion revolution. His books include Worst Enemy (Ivan R. Dee, 2008); 
Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits (Ivan R. Dee, 2011); and with Hy 
Rothstein, Afghan Endgames (Georgetown University Press, 2012). Dr. 
Arquilla has acted as a consultant to military commanders in conflicts 
ranging from Operation Desert Storm to the Kosovo War and the Afghan 
campaign. His research currently focuses on the need for nations to 
develop networks of their own to combat terrorists and armed insurgents.
Dr. Christopher C. Harmon currently serves on the faculty of the 
Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, 
Hawaii. He first published on terrorism in 1982 and has taught in related 
programs in a half-dozen civilian and military graduate schools. From 
2010 to 2014, Dr. Harmon served as the Horner Chair of Military 
Theory at the US Marine Corps University. Dr. Harmon is the author 
or editor of five books, including two editions of Terrorism Today 
(Routledge, 2000, 2007) and Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism 
(McGraw-Hill, 2010); he also recently contributed two essays to Orbis. 
Dr. Harmon serves on the editorial boards of Terrorism & Political 
Violence and CTX.
Dr. Letitia Lawson is a senior lecturer in the Department of National 
Security Affairs at NPS. She teaches African Studies, including courses 
on security, government and politics, history, and cultures, as well as 
research methods and comparative politics. Dr. Lawson earned a PhD 
in political science and an MA in sociology from the University of 
California at Davis, an MA in international affairs from Columbia Uni-
versity, and a BA in economics from Smith College. She has published 
on various aspects of state-building in Africa and on US Africa policy. 
Dr. Lawson travels regularly to Africa as a member of the Center for 
Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) faculty.
George Lober guides US and international military students through 
the tricky terrain of ethics and critical thinking at NPS. He earned his 
BA and MA in English from the California State University system, and 
became interested in the study of ethics through a reacquaintance with 
both philosophy and critical thinking after joining the faculty of NPS in 
1999.
Colonel (Ret.) Eugene Michael Mensch is a consultant on Africa. In 
his previous position as Africa program manager for CCMR, he con-
ducted over 100 civil-military relations seminars in 34 African countries. 
After commissioning and service in the Vietnam War, he became a foreign 
affairs specialist and served in Africa and the Middle East for 15 years, 
with assignments as defense and/or army attaché in Chad, Namibia, 
Tunisia, South Africa, Swaziland, and Lesotho. COL Mensch has a 
bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree from NPS. He is a graduate of the 
Armed Forces Staff College, the Army War College, the Foreign Service 
Institute (Arabic), and the Defense Language Institute (Arabic and 
French). He is a member of the US Defense Attaché Hall of Fame. 
Robert Nickelsberg has worked as a Time magazine contract photog-
rapher for nearly 30 years, specializing in political and cultural change 
in developing countries. He lived in New Delhi from 1988 to 1999, and 
his assignments have taken him to Iraq, Kuwait, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Burma, and Indonesia. His images have appeared in publications 
including Time, the New York Times, Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal, 
the Financial Times, the Guardian, Paris Match, and Stern, and on CNN 
and NBC. His photographs have been exhibited at the Philadelphia 
Museum of Art, the International Center of Photography in New York, 
and the New America Foundation in Washington, DC. His recent 
book, Afghanistan: A Distant War (New York: Prestel, 2013), received 
the Olivier Rebbot Award in 2013 for the best reporting from abroad in 
books and magazines. Mr. Nickelsberg is a graduate of the University of 
Vermont. 
Lieutenant Colonel Sylvester Perera is currently working toward a mas-
ter’s degree in Defense Analysis at NPS. He joined the Sri Lankan Army 
as an officer cadet in 1990 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant 
to the Gemunu Watch regiment in 1992. He has held numerous appoint-
ments in command, staff, and instructor capacities during his military 
career, including commander of a platoon and company in the 6th Bat-
talion and commander of the 8th Battalion of the Gemunu Watch. LTC 
Perera served in the directing staff of the Sri Lankan Defence Services 
Command and Staff College from 2012 to 2015.
Major Birger Soerensen has served in the special operations unit of the 
Royal Danish Army, the Jaegerkorpset (Hunter Corps), for more than 
13 years. He has filled various functions from team leader and platoon/
squadron commander to the chief of operations. He has extensive opera-
tional experience from the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. MAJ Soerensen 
received his officer’s education at the Royal Danish Military Academy and 
is currently enrolled in the Special Operations and Irregular Warfare cur-
riculum at NPS. Upon his return to Denmark, MAJ Soerensen will serve in 
the newly created Danish Special Operations Command.
Nicholas Tomb is the program manager for the Africa Program at 
CCMR. Prior to this, he was the assistant program manger for the 
Collaborative and Adaptive Security Initiative and program coordinator 
for the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies at NPS. 
His focus is on executive education, conflict management, post-conflict 
recovery, civil-military relations, and civil society organizations. Mr. Tomb 
is a co-founder and former president of Global Majority, an international 
non-profit conflict resolution organization, and he is the board chairman 




Afghan widow Zahra Husseini with a relative’s daughter, Abida. 
September 2015. © Robert Nickelsberg. 
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The War Widows of Afghanistan
by Robert Nickelsberg
When I was in Kabul, Afghanistan, at the end of August 
2015 to oversee the installation of an exhibit of my pho-
tography in the Afghanistan Center at Kabul University, 
I was struck by the rapidly deteriorating security situ-
ation the Afghan people faced. There was a 28 percent 
increase in the number of dead and wounded security 
personnel, including army and police, in 2015 compared 
to 2014.1 I had only seven days in Kabul, and it seemed to 
me that the best way I could illustrate this tragedy would 
be to search out and speak with a number of surviving 
widows: women who were bearing the brunt of survival 
for themselves and their children without a male bread-
winner. I also wanted to find out how the Ministries of 
Defense and of Interior Affairs were looking after these 
families, especially given that the traditional Afghan 
fighting season would continue through the winter 
months and thus, more men were bound to die. Afghan-
istan already has an enormous population of war widows, 
both military and civilian, who do not receive any official 
support. The photographs presented in this essay, taken 
between 30 August 2015 and 6 September 2015, come from 
this project.
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Every wife of an Afghan soldier or policemen killed in the line of duty is eligible for regular 
payments from her husband’s service branch equal to his salary. The widows of civilians killed 
in terrorist attacks are to be given 5,000 afghanis per month, or about USD$80. If you ask 
these women how much they’ve actually received, however, they will tell you that they’ve 
gotten one full payment and a bit more after that. Even at best, the payments usually stop 
in less than a year, and the women have no further recourse. Humanitarian assistance for 
widows, whether from the Afghan government, a United Nations agency, or an international 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), is often undermined by a tradition of male dominance 
that goes unchallenged and perpetuates the dependent status of women. Both tradition and 
pseudo-legal norms such as men’s hereditary property rights are codified through interpreta-
tion of the Qur’an. If school fees are thought to be too high, girls may be pulled out of school 
and made to take on housecleaning and other daily chores. Once they reach puberty, girls 
and women are traditionally kept separate from their male relatives in some form of purdah 
(sequestration). The intense societal pressures in rural agricultural areas further reinforce this 
traditional hierarchy and the vulnerability of women. As a result, most widows are unedu-
cated and illiterate. They are often left to fend for themselves and are highly vulnerable to 
abuse and neglect. Still, women who are resigned to their fate nevertheless possess the strength 
to endure. 
About Marastoon
The plight of Afghan widows varies but is invariably harsh. Most of them have had to endure the 
subjugation of traditional arranged marriages and male domination in all aspects of life. Some 
of these women, however, have been able to find reprieve from the bleakness of their lives in the 
Marastoon Social Welfare Center in Kabul, a shelter for war widows and others without family 
support. The Center, which is funded by the Afghan Red Crescent Society and the Afghan 
government, offers these women the possibility of making their own choices about the future.
Marastoon is supported by the Afghan Red Crescent Society and also receives some govern-
ment funding, though it’s unclear how much support comes from the government in Kabul 
and in what form. The Center sits well off the main road in western Kabul, in an extensive 
campus-like garden setting that has been maintained since the 1930s as a government-run 
orphanage and as a home for the mentally handicapped. Marastoon suffered greatly during the 
Afghan civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal and fell into neglect under the Taliban. 
Since 9/11 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the Center has regained its stature with 
donations from the international community and funding from foreign NGOs. It now houses 
24 families. Women have access to classes in tailoring and dressmaking, embroidery, basic 
carpentry, and needlepoint. Marastoon also provides a free health clinic to families in the 
neighborhood, although it’s very hard to determine who is or is not eligible. There does not, 
however, appear to be a literacy program for the residents. Providing education for women is 
considered a financial burden in a country where unemployment can approach 30 percent. For 
chronically cash-strapped Afghan government agencies, reforming assistance programs and 
supporting the growing number of widows is not a priority.
Overall, media access to Marastoon is spotty. To make the photographs in this essay, my team 
had to deal directly with people in the housing and training programs. There’s very little 
precedent in Afghan culture and society for an institution like Marastoon. Humanitarian and 
charity work are not popular sectors of Afghan society, and the social welfare offices are rarely 
fully funded. As is often the case in Asian countries, aid and assistance are provided within the 
extended family structure. The Afghan Red Crescent Society is the main link for Marastoon 
and its residents to outside funding and assistance, the United Nations, and the various 
embassies that oversee their countries’ aid programs. 
7May 2016
Amina
8CTX | Vol. 6, No. 2
In a country torn apart by four decades of political instability and war, Jamella personifies a growing number of Afghan 
women who have suffered from their husband’s fatal decision to join either the Afghan National Army or National Police. 
Jamella’s husband, a 35-year-old Afghan National Army soldier, was killed by the Taliban nearly four years ago, when a 
rocket-propelled grenade struck his American-supplied truck, killing its occupants. The Afghan military compensated 
Jamella, who was 34 at the time, by paying for her husband’s coffin, contributing some rice, oil, and other food items to the 
family, and giving her a bit of cash. As mentioned earlier, widows are entitled to a pension equivalent to their husband’s 
salary, about $120 a month, but Jamella has not heard from the Ministry of Defense or the army for nearly three years. In 
2015, Jamella married off her 15-year-old daughter to lighten her financial load and moved with her other child into her 
parents’ home in Lagman province, two hours from Kabul. Soon after, however, her mother died, and her brothers could 
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Abida’s husband, a taxi driver, died from injuries suffered in a suicide car-bombing in 2012. Two of her children now stay 
with her at Marastoon while three others live with relatives outside Kabul. As is customary in Afghanistan, Abida was 
offered marriage to her brother-in-law, but when she declined, she and her children had to leave her in-laws’ house. She 
had neither savings nor a pension from her husband’s death. A doctor who treated her husband before he died urged her 
to sell one of her children to lessen the financial burden. Instead, Abida is taking tailoring classes at Marastoon to become 
a dressmaker and gain some financial independence. It’s not uncommon for the downtrodden in Afghanistan to pay off 
personal or family debts by offering a child to another family as an indentured servant or farmhand. For girls and women, 
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Safia Tajweed, 36, lives with her two sons at Marastoon, while her five daughters live with assorted relatives. Four years 
ago, in 2012, Safia’s husband, an Afghan Border Police officer from Badakhshan province, was killed when the Taliban 
overran his post. Safia was given a compensation payment of 100,000 afghanis, or $2,000, when his body was returned to 
her. Since her husband’s burial, she has not heard from the police and remains ignorant about the status of her pension. 
When I spoke with her, Safia remarked that an Afghan woman can’t fight for her rights in Afghan culture, least of all in 
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Zahra Husseini, 45, sits in her Kabul apartment with a relative’s daughter, Abida, right, 3 September 2015. 
Zahra’s husband died in the late 1990s from injuries suffered in a rocket attack that struck their shop during the civil war 
with the Taliban. She worked for nearly two years as a cook at a Kabul NGO but stopped working when a rotator cuff in-
jury in her shoulder left her barely able to lift her arm. Zahra has three sons, one of whom is paralyzed from a car accident. 
Her second son works in a bakery and earns $2.50 per day. Her third son goes to school. Zahra pays $20 a month for rent 
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Hamida works as a cleaning woman for a small NGO, where she earns 10,000 afghanis per month, or $160. Her husband 
was also killed by Taliban forces in the late 1990s, near Quetta, Pakistan, where the family was taking refuge. As ethnic 
Hazaras and Shi’a Muslims, Hamida and her husband had fled Kabul from fear of persecution by the predominantly Sunni 
Taliban. Hamida, with her two sons and three daughters, returned to Kabul once the Taliban were removed from power 
following 9/11. After their return, her eldest son was killed in a suicide bomb attack. Her surviving son suffers from rheu-
matism and is unable to work. Hamida’s main concern now is traffic gridlock at rush hour, which increases the likelihood 
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The suffering of Afghan women is not, of course, confined 
to war widows. Amina Sajadi’s husband is in jail for 10 years 
because of a propane tank explosion that killed his brother, a 
crime Amina claims he did not commit. With two children to 
support, Amina, 27, lacks the money to hire a lawyer to appeal 
the sentence. After her husband’s incarceration, she tried to 
support the family by working as a cleaning woman, until the 
prospect of destitution led her to Marastoon two years ago. 
She has no parents to assist her. She sees her husband once a 
year, and he calls her if he needs anything. He has been in jail 
for four years and won’t be released until 2022. 
Final Thoughts
The cultural headwinds in Afghanistan are generally against 
organizations like Marastoon that support female empower-
ment and gender equality. Such programs are considered a 
threat to the traditional male power structure, and liberal 
Western countries and organizations have had to temper their 
public enthusiasm for aid and assistance programs that could 
actually endanger women in the religiously conservative re-
gions of the country. I’m grateful to the women of Marastoon 
for their courage and for allowing me to share their stories 
and images. ²
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Robert Nickelsberg worked as a Time magazine contract 
photographer for nearly 30 years.
EDITOR’S NOTE
To learn more about Robert Nickelsberg and his career as 
a photojournalist for Time magazine and other publica-
tions, see “The CTAP Interview: Robert Nickelsberg,” 
in CTX 5, no. 1 (February 2015): https://globalecco.org/
ctap-interview-robert-nickelsberg-time-magazine
Copyright 2015, Robert Nickelsberg. The US federal government is granted 
for itself and others acting on its behalf in perpetuity a paid-up, nonex-
clusive, irrevocable worldwide license in this work to reproduce, prepare 
derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and 
display publicly, by or on behalf of the US federal government. All other 
rights are reserved by the copyright owner(s). Foreign copyrights may apply.
NOTES
1  An estimated 16,000 Afghan security personnel were killed or 
wounded in 2015. The figure in 2014 was approximately 12,500. 
Tom Vanden Brook, “Afghan Casualties Surged in 2015 because 






Walking the Thin Red Line: 
DANSOF in Afghanistan
MAJ Birger Soerensen,  
Danish SOF
Denmark has a long tradition of contributing to stabiliza-
tion engagements. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Denmark was heavily involved 
in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, specifically in 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. From 2003 to 2007, Danish forces 
participated in the stabilization mission in Iraq, notably in the southern region 
around Basra.1 Denmark has also been engaged in Afghanistan since 2002, 
primarily in Helmand province between 2006 and 2014. This main effort was 
supported by extensive operations centered on a battalion battle group of about 
700 soldiers close to the major city of Gereskh. Other branches of the Danish 
government have been active in Helmand as well, including a police detachment 
and political, legal, agricultural, and health advisors. 
These missions contributed valuable lessons learned with respect to the Danish 
government’s whole-of-government approach to stabilization engagements. 
This approach is described in a 2013 report titled Danish Integrated Stabilization 
Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World.2 The intentions of 
this policy—to stabilize post-conflict areas by taking advantage of and creating 
synergy between every Danish, international, and local government tool—were 
well-known to the members of Task Force 7 (TF7) when we deployed to Hel-
mand in 2012. The policy further emphasized that we were working in another 
country, on that country’s terms, and that we must observe and respect its 
culture and customs. The policy’s goal was to build up the country’s institutions 
to be self-sustaining rather than make them dependent on Danish technologies 
and procedures.
Background on DANSOF
The Danish Special Operations Force (DANSOF) is composed of a maritime SOF 
unit, the Royal Frogman Corps (Froemandskorpset), and a land SOF unit, the 
Hunter Corps ( Jaegerkorpset). During the period described in this article, the 
units were under the command of the Danish Army Operational Command and 
the Royal Danish Navy. In 2015, both units were transferred to the newly formed 
Danish Special Operations Command.3
Historically, DANSOF has focused on the two NATO SOF tasks of direct action 
and special reconnaissance.4 A third SOF task, military assistance, which is in 
part a combination of what US SOF call foreign internal defense (FID), security 
force assistance (SFA), and counterinsurgency (COIN), has largely been neglected 
by Danish SOF.5 Some of the other roles within military assistance that are 
relevant to stabilization engagements, however, are familiar to DANSOF. 
For example, DANSOF has provided special support to the Danish police and 
supported Danish conventional forces with stabilization operations. In fulfilling 
these missions, DANSOF personnel gained experience in training and operating 
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At the beginning of 2011, we learned that DANSOF would contribute to the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) SOF task of building up Afghan 
provincial response companies (PRCs)—quick-response police units capable of 
undertaking special operations. DANSOF decision makers therefore decided to im-
prove their knowledge of the SFA/FID/COIN aspects of military assistance. They 
opted to send a fact-finding team to Kabul to join the US TF10, a unit made up of 
an Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) from Special Forces Group 10 that was 
building up several PRCs in the provinces around Kabul. I was part of this prelimi-
nary fact-finding mission and commanded the partnering detail of TF7 on its first 
four-month rotation. For the duration of TF7’s mission, I was in command of the 
operations section back in Denmark and closely observed the progress of TF7 and 
PRC-Helmand (PRC-H)—the PRC that TF7 would eventually be responsible for. 
Gaining Valuable Knowledge with TF10
The Danish fact-finding team joined TF10 in April 2011. The team staff detach-
ment, of which I was a part, stayed with the US ODB in Kabul, while two Danish 
SOF teams, along with embedded SOF from Hungary and Romania, joined two 
US Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) in the provinces of Wardak and 
Logar. This international variety of SOF personnel did much to improve our 
learning experience by giving the DANSOF staff and operators an opportunity to 
observe each team’s approach to training, advising, and assisting the PRCs. 
The DANSOF fact-finding team stayed with TF10 for three months, until July 
2011. The staff detachment participated in planning sessions, monitored ODA 
missions, and accumulated valuable lessons from TF10 staff. Foremost was 
the lesson on how to build a self-sustaining PRC. Imagining ourselves in the 
Afghans’ place and envisioning what they needed was both a practical and an 
intellectual challenge. TF7 would need a keen understanding of Afghan culture 
and customs, as well as Afghan approaches to both daily routines and operations. 
Otherwise, we could easily make the mistake of building the PRC as a Danish or 
Western unit. The Afghans are a much more patient people than the Danes, and 
it became apparent that TF7 could easily do irreparable damage by trying to rush 
the creation of PRC-H. On the one hand, we had to ensure the company had the 
necessary depth and substance to sustain itself and be effective. On the other 
hand, to do this it seemed we would have to introduce a measure of organization 
that the Afghans lacked. Another issue was that, too often, Western units doing 
SFA fixated on the kinetic part of a unit—the platoons and teams—and ignored 
the staff, the very part of a unit that makes it self-sustainable. 
We decided to focus on the entire PRC, from the commander down to each 
individual policeman. The staff ’s lessons were supplemented by observations 
from the SOF teams in Wardak and Logar. One important lesson was to weigh 
the need for training the PRC against the constant pressure from ISAF SOF to 
produce results, such as neutralizing (capturing or killing) adversaries or stop-
ping major criminal activities. This dual purpose, coming down from ISAF SOF, 
could potentionally confuse TF10 and other TFs. The main purpose of TF10 was 
to build the PRCs up to a self-sustainable level before the end of 2014, at which 
time ISAF combat troops were to leave the country. At the same time, ISAF hoped 
to keep the adversary suppressed to a manageable level, which meant that TF10 
was often forced to take the PRCs on missions for which the Afghans were, at 
best, only partially ready. The result was that too much of the time allocated for 
WE COULD EASILY 
MAKE THE MISTAKE 
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the main mission was wasted on the secondary mission. The fact-finding team 
observed this delicate balance and noted its importance for building a sustain-
able internal security force.
TF7: Deployment and Encountering PRC-H
After completing a thorough pre-mission training session in Denmark, a 
DANSOF preparation team, of which I was a member, deployed in January 2012 
to Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand. The preparation team established basic 
necessities like setting up the camp for TF7, and more important, we initiated the 
training, intelligence, and operations procedures required for the mission. We 
also quickly began developing a relationship with the British Helmand brigade 
(TF Helmand), which operated the main ISAF base in Lashkar Gah, Main Oper-
ating Base Lash (MOB Lash). MOB Lash was to be the main base for TF7 for the 
duration of the mission, while TF Helmand would provide essential supporting 
elements such as a quick reaction force, counter-IED teams, medical support, 
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). We also built important relationships with 
other SOF units in Helmand, and with the US Marines in MOB Bastion, in the 
western part of the province.
In early February, TF7 arrived in Helmand and immediately started its mission. 
TF7 had organized its 51 personnel into four elements—staff, combat support, 
combat service support, and combat—tailored to match its PRC counterparts 
(see figure 1). Resource shortages limited DANSOF’s concept for a more robust 
task force, but overall, TF7 was well organized to partner with PRC-H. PRC-H had 
already been partnering with a British conventional unit for six months, and this 
unit conducted 
the handover 
to TF7. Though 
the British had 
done the best 
they could in the 
circumstances, 
PRC-H was in 
terrible shape 
on all accounts: 
manning was at 
just 50 percent 
of the planned 
125 policemen; 




sickness; and the 
food was limited 
and of poor 
quality. 
As the com-
mander of TF7’s 
partnering effort, 
TOO MUCH OF THE 
TIME ALLOCATED FOR 
THE MAIN MISSION 
WAS WASTED ON THE 
SECONDARY MISSION.
Figure 1: Status of TF7 as of November 2012
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I was also the 
direct mentor to 
the PRC com-
mander. My first 
move was to 
consult with him 
for an in-depth 
assessment of 
the PRC. The 
PRC’s makeup 
was based on 
a standard 
American SOF 
unit, with the 
usual headquar-
ters (HQ) unit 
(four personnel), 




platoons of 35 
personnel each) 




were low, and I would describe many of the 60-odd policemen present as, at 
best, farmers with guns in their hands—which, in fact, they mostly were. The 
PRC commander had simply hired all available hands in an effort to meet the 
demands of the ISAF-styled organization.
Making a Plan for a Self-Sustainable PRC-H
With this information as a baseline, TF7 took a few days to update the two-year 
plan we had made back in Denmark for the partnering mission with PRC-H, 
using onsite observations to fill in the gaps in the initial plan. The components of 
the new plan were as follows.
1. A timeline with milestones for essential development phases of the PRC over 
the two-year period. This timeline included an initial six-month partnered 
phase, in which TF7 would lead most training sessions and head all 
operations. This was to be followed by an enabled phase of approximately 
eight months, during which the Afghans would gradually take over parts 
of the training and lead operations, closely supported by TF7. In the final 
10-month advanced phase, PRC-H would conduct operations on its own, 
monitored by TF7, and would receive our advice and support only in 
extreme cases. After this, TF7 would redeploy back to Denmark, leaving 
in place a PRC-H that could work independently with minimal or no 
supervision.
2. A plan to build relations and cooperation with other key Afghan units, 
HQs, and legal entities. The most important of these was the Helmand 
Figure 2: Status of PRC-H as of November 2012  
(Red numbers indicate actual personnel, black numbers indicate intended personnel.)
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provincial police headquarters (PPHQ ), which was the PRC’s main 
supplier of intelligence and administrative and logistical support, 
including manning, food, accommodation, and vehicles. The PPHQ also 
ran targeting meetings, at which potential targets for investigation or 
arrest were assessed and distributed among the available police units. The 
PRC was “the new kid on the block,” which made it essential to quickly 
integrate the PRC into the PPHQ and make it part of the Afghan security 
system and targeting cycle, as opposed to having it remain dependent on 
ISAF. An essential actor in the police system was the chief of the PPHQ. 
To facilitate a good rapport between TF7, PRC-H, and the provincial 
police chief, our TF7 commander served as a direct liaison. He and the 
chief held weekly meetings to ensure they shared an understanding of the 
direction and goals for PRC-H.
Another important HQ within the PRC-H orbit was the General Direc-
torate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) which, on paper, was in charge of 
the PRC and all intelligence surveillance units. The GDPSU was responsible 
for most operational and administrative issues for the PRC, but in many 
situations the proximity of the PPHQ to PRC-H made it the de facto HQ 
for all practical purposes. An intelligence surveillance unit was the PRC’s 
direct partner for gathering human intelligence and was the main source 
of intelligence for the PRC. Consequently, we invested a considerable 
amount of effort in that relationship. It was equally important to have 
good connections in the Afghan judicial system, because the PRC would 
be going after some of the “high-value targets” in the area. Too often, 
suspected criminals were apprehended but not prosecuted—a practice 
that did not engage the Afghan judicial system as a whole and in many 
cases led to a suspect’s release. For this reason, it was essential that the 
PRC actually bring those it apprehended to justice according to the Af-
ghan rule of law. Other important potential partners included the many 
Special Police units in Helmand, with whom the PRC could cooperate for 
training or operations, and the newly formed Afghan helicopter unit.
3. A program to build the internal capacity for a balanced and self-sustainable 
PRC by training all sections of the HQ, staff, and combat units. This was, 
simultaneously, one of the most important and most difficult tasks, 
because the Afghans were not familiar with our Western penchant for 
thorough organization. We had to balance between Western organiza-
tional methods and Afghan culture—and to a certain extent, impose 
our ideas and methods on the Afghans. This dilemma had to be handled 
delicately, or our best efforts could prove counterproductive. In addition, 
developing the whole PRC organization meant training all members of 
each element not only in tactical and technical police skills, but also in 
other general skills such as literacy.
4. A program to develop a cadre of Afghan instructors as quickly as possible 
to support the PRC. This would be accomplished by sending policemen 
to non-commissioned officer training at an Afghan NCO school, and 
through additional TF7 training. As the cadre gained proficiency, the 
Afghans themselves would take an increasing role as instructors in the 
PRC’s regular training program.
5. A plan for selecting and training the future leaders of the PRC as soon as 
possible. The PRC lacked planners, practitioners, and role models, and 
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instructors, we would remedy this by sending candidates through the 
NCO school, the officers’ academy, and daily officer and NCO training. 
The Plan Unfolds 
The plan did not unfold smoothly. Even with our systematic preparation, many 
surprises hit us on a weekly, if not daily, basis, mostly related to our focus on 
self-sustainment. TF7’s conviction that we had to help the Afghans stand on 
their own two feet was so central to our concept that we were ready to sacrifice 
operational success for a time. For months, we struggled with manning, the 
targeting process, and the Afghan judicial system, while slowly raising the PRC’s 
organizational proficiency to an acceptable level. In addition, we balanced the 
need for intensive instruction to drive progress with the need for the Afghans to 
learn from their own mistakes. In this process, we did all we could to protect the 
PRC from overly complicated or dangerous missions, or took the lead ourselves if 
we thought the potential gains outweighed the risks. Another issue was equip-
ment: we repeatedly pushed for the kinds of gear that the PRC would be able to 
maintain themselves, while avoiding expensive technical tools they could never 
hope to maintain after we left. Again, this focus on self-reliance sacrificed short-
term results in operations in favor of healthy long-term development.
Another challenge to our efforts was corruption. Every layer of the Afghan 
justice system, including the police, seemed to be exposed to a high level of cor-
ruption. We constantly had to judge whether an issue of misbehavior was worth 
pushing or better abandoned to avoid further complications. For example, only 
two months into our mission, we had to ask the provincial police chief to fire the 
PRC commander after the commander was caught misusing his power. This set 
the PRC back a bit, because the commander took some of his closest men with 
him when he left. In the end, though, it proved to be a good decision, because 
the new commander, who arrived a month later, had Special Police experience 
and went on to play an essential role in making the PRC self-sustainable over 
time.
While developing the PRC, TF7 occasionally supported the British-led TF 
Helmand. This TF, however, usually conducted operations with large armored 
infantry formations using conventional search and destroy tactics that did not sit 
well with our Special Police force and did not seem to reflect efficient COIN tac-
tics.6 It was my impression that these operations seldom achieved much, because 
the Taliban simply refused to give battle and disappeared into the countryside. 
We therefore cooperated primarily with other Afghan Special Police forces and 
focused on building long-term relations for the PRC.
After 10 months of “massaging” the provincial justice system and building the 
PRC’s proficiencies, we reached a milestone. PRC-H went on its first warrant-
based operation, carrying an arrest warrant signed by both the Lashkar Gar 
prosecutor and judge. PRC-H was, to my knowledge, the first Afghan PRC to 
achieve this, and the operation was subsequently used as a model throughout 
the ISAF system. As TF7’s redeployment deadline in December 2013 approached, 
PRC-H achieved further successes that, in my mind, set it apart from other Af-
ghan units. It was almost fully manned; it had a solid cadre of officers and NCOs; 
it was well-integrated into the Afghan police organization; and it could conduct 
successful, independent operations based on information from an intelligence 
surveillance unit or the PPHQ. In sum, we felt we could hand over a PRC that was 
EVERY LAYER OF THE 
AFGHAN JUSTICE 
SYSTEM SEEMED TO BE 




not a Western-style police unit, but a self-sustainable Special Police unit tailored 
to Afghan conditions. 
Relations to ISAF SOF
Initially, we shared a good understanding of the purpose of the mission with 
ISAF SOF. Upon arriving in February 2012, we presented our ideas for a late-2013 
end-state and received good feedback. Our plan to deliver a self-sustaining PRC 
in two years seemed ambitious but possible as long as the PRC’s development was 
gradual. To this end, ISAF SOF agreed that operations, at least for a time, would 
come second to training and the general development of the unit. But while our 
superiors agreed in theory, the reality was different. In the early stages of our 
mission, we were allowed to concentrate on the build-up process, but after two 
to three months, it became apparent to us that ISAF SOF wanted us to push the 
PRC harder than was previously agreed.
Although the development of a self-sustainable Afghanistan was the articulated 
goal of ISAF, a conventional focus on neutralizing the enemy prevailed in fact. I 
observed this tendency to let the kinetic effect on the enemy take priority over 
development of the PRCs in many of my mission reports, and my commander 
had heated discussions with ISAF SOF on this issue. Such an operational focus 
went against several counterinsurgency ground truths, such as separating the 
insurgents from the population rather than attacking them directly, and building 
an indigenous police force that could provide the intelligence and manpower 
needed to facilitate that very separation.7 We were left trying to balance what we 
thought was the right thing to do, and what supported the goals of Danish stabi-
lization policy, against the demands of ISAF SOF. I am certain that ISAF SOF was 
under great pressure from the Joint Forces Command (JFC) to deliver results “on 
the battlefield,” and that it was ultimately within the JFC that this conventional 
campaign focus originated. In many respects, I cannot help thinking that ISAF 
was repeating mistakes from earlier US COIN campaigns, such as in Vietnam. 
Conclusion
The most important conclusions I draw from this experience relate to the need 
to build self-sustaining indigenous security units. In this article, I have concen-
trated on the best practices and successes of TF7 and PRC-H, but during TF7’s 
deployment in Helmand, it was apparent to me that many TFs used their position 
leading Afghan forces more as an excuse for undertaking operations than an 
opportunity to guide the Afghans to a high and sustainable level of proficiency.8 
In my mind, this was due to the tacit understanding within JFC and ISAF SOF that 
their main purpose was to kinetically neutralize the enemy faster than it could 
reproduce itself. I challenge that understanding. I contend, moreover, that for a 
country to eventually be able to stand on its own two feet, partners must concen-
trate on working with and through that country’s existing systems to separate the 
insurgents from the population. For TF7, that meant we constantly focused on 
improving the ability of the PRC to sustain itself within the Afghan system. 
An important part of our plan was to make sure we gave the PRC equipment that 
its members could use and maintain without us. It would have been pointless to 
train them to depend on devices like mortars or UAVs, which they could not use 
after we left. Likewise, it was paramount that the Afghans learned to use their 
ISAF SOF WANTED 
US TO PUSH THE PRC 
HARDER THAN WAS 
PREVIOUSLY AGREED.
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own indigenous organizations, both those within the PRC and external ones 
such as the various HQs and the Afghan judicial system. Corruption was another 
ever-present obstacle, and I cannot say we outsiders fully understood all the ways 
it operated. We did our best to balance a tolerance for some levels of corruption 
as an integral part of Afghan life with the need to strike down hard when it 
hindered our goal of building a reliable police force that the people of Afghani-
stan might eventually learn to trust. 
I see some contradictions between, on the one hand, a Danish integrated 
stabilization engagement that works with and through the local population and 
emphasizes cultural awareness and self-sustainability—a whole-of-government 
approach—and on the other hand, a US-NATO–led kill-or-capture COIN 
campaign, such as we have seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Additionally, the 
ineffectiveness of the conventional armored infantry tactics used by TF Helmand 
in COIN operations shines a light on the potential usefulness of smaller, more 
flexible units such as DANSOF stabilization engagements.9 ²
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The Lessons I Learned: Civil-Military 
Cooperation in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka
LTC Sylvester Perera,  
Sri Lankan Army
The Sri Lankan Army, the “Guardian of the Nation,” fulfilled 
its duty to the motherland in 2009 by eradicating terrorism from the island 
after three decades of ruthless war. After the war ended, the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of war-affected areas in the north and east became particularly 
important for national development. Compared with the rest of the country, the 
socioeconomic inequalities in these areas were clearly evident. The government 
needed to promote rapid development in all aspects of the economy, particularly 
infrastructure development. The use of the army for these development proj-
ects was a feasible and effective option for the government to fill the post-war 
vacuum in resources and people.
I was the commanding officer of the 8th Battalion of the Gemunu Watch in the 
Sri Lankan Army between 2010 and 2012. Our battalion was charged with con-
ducting resettlement and reconstruction operations in remote areas of Batticaloa 
Province, along the eastern seaboard of Sri Lanka. After three decades of conflict 
against the LTTE, the government of Sri Lanka and its military embarked on a 
number of large- and medium-scale infrastructure development projects across 
the country. Batticaloa Province, where my battalion was deployed, had been 
devastated by the fighting. The people in the area were very poor, a situation the 
LTTE had exploited to ensure their own survival. Many of the people had been 
highly dependent on and supportive of the LTTE during the conflict, so it was 
not an easy task for us to win them over and gain their trust.
I was well positioned to compare these duties with my experience in 1995 in the 
Northern Province district of Jaffna, where I was involved in the resettlement of 
the Tamil people immediately following the liberation of the Jaffna Peninsula 
from the insurgent Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).1 From these two 
experiences, I learned that communication with local residents, and making 
the effort to understand their aspirations and attitudes before we initiated our 
civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) projects, was the key to success. People must 
be committed to and responsible for improving their own way of life; if not, 
government development projects will not help them to achieve good results 
and will lead to problems such as unrest in the long run. It is of paramount 
importance to help people who have experienced a crisis, such as war, to heal 
their wounds, if we are to win their hearts and minds. 
The Resettlement of the Tamil People in Jaffna, 1995
My battalion was deployed to the residential area of Jaffna city in 1995 to provide 
security and resettle the Tamil people who had been displaced during the 
conflict. During the initial stage of this project, we provided for residents’ basic 
needs, including the distribution of food items. We also looked into the status of 
various welfare facilities throughout our area of control, such as medical clinics. 
After the resettlement process was complete, however, our battalion maintained 
a close watch on the behavior of those who had been resettled, because we felt 
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that our efforts to enhance their welfare were not as fruitful as we had expected. 
For example, at the food distribution points, we asked people to fall in line to 
receive the parcels. Despite being in serious need of essential food items, some 
people were reluctant to form a queue to receive the parcels.  
When we questioned them, we came to understand that there was a significant 
problem concerning their caste.2 Members of the higher caste were reluctant to 
move freely and stand in line among those of the lower castes. As a result, we 
had to change our distribution system to avoid provoking a negative situation. 
We also opened up shops where higher caste people could purchase the basic 
necessities that they were reluctant to accept for free. This problem of caste arose 
in other matters as well. If we had opted to ignore these concerns, it is likely that 
whatever services we extended to the people of Jaffna in good faith would not 
have been welcomed. It is even possible that neglecting to navigate within the 
deeply held caste traditions could have reignited local animosities and incited 
hostility towards the military forces.
Post-Conflict Welfare Projects, 2009 
After defeating the LTTE terrorist group in 2009, the Sri Lankan government 
made immediate infrastructure development a priority. It implemented broad 
development programs called Uthuru Wasanthaya (Northern Spring) and 
Nagenahira Udanaya (Awakening East) to improve the infrastructure. These 
projects included rebuilding and repairing roads, hospitals, schools, and regional 
government administration buildings of the Northern Province and the Eastern 
Province, both of which had been completely devastated by war and neglect. 
The government allocated 253 billion Sri Lankan rupees (LKR) to the Northern 
Province and LKR 6.1 billion for the projects in the Eastern Province, which were 
intended mainly to raise the general standard of living in the district of Batticaloa.3 
In addition, the army was assigned to provide humanitarian assistance and basic 
infrastructure development, primarily through housing and road construction.
My battalion was assigned to the Batticaloa district in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Prov-
ince, a majority Tamil region where there had been heavy fighting during the civil 
conflict. The battalion’s chief role was to maintain security, but it also assisted in 
the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure in the area and the resettlement of 
displaced people. CIMIC was a new concept for the troops of my battalion, who 
had previously been engaged in combat operations in the north. We were hopeful 
that this assistance would favorably influence the local people’s perception of the 
army. The battalion was closely involved in various projects in the area, such as 
constructing houses and roads, and assisting people to develop their livelihoods. 
In addition, with the approval of the security force headquarters, I obtained the 
assistance of the Engineer of the Plant Squadron and the experienced troops of 
the engineer regiment to construct a minor road. Filling the dual roles of con-
ducting CIMIC operations and providing security for the area was not an easy task 
for the members of my battalion, but they performed extremely well in all their 
military and civil-military projects, thanks to the hierarchical military structure: 
its command system, leadership, commitment, dedication, and discipline. 
Good Intentions Can Go Wrong
As became clear from my earlier experience in Jaffna, good intentions can 
go wrong. My battalion was tasked to open a “welfare shop” to provide basic 
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necessities to the public, but the project did not have good results. At that time, 
there was no regular transportation system to give the rural population access 
to the main town, and there were only a few local shops owned by villagers. The 
items in these rural shops were very expensive compared to the shops closer to 
the main town because of the costs of labor and transportation. To remedy this, 
the battalion invested LKR 200,000 to open a village shop that could provide 
basic goods at a cheaper price, because we had no labor and transportation costs 
and were able to purchase items in bulk at wholesale prices. The local people 
benefited greatly from the new shop. 
After a few months, however, we began to hear complaints against the soldiers 
running the shop from certain villagers in the area. When we inquired into 
the complaints, we learned that the lower prices in our welfare shop had badly 
affected the families who earned their income through the village shops. For 
that reason, when I took over command of the battalion, I decided to close the 
welfare shop immediately. Although the shops owned by the villagers had higher 
prices, they were an important source of income not only for the shopkeepers, 
but also for many local families that were involved in other businesses connected 
to these shops. We had to ensure that our welfare projects were helping and not 
harming the villagers and their local economy.
As a result of this experience, I decided to make arrangements to improve the 
income and livelihood of the villagers in the area of Batticaloa West, where my 
main camp was situated. Their main sources of income were cattle farming, 
fishing, and rice cultivation. The villagers found it difficult to find a steady 
market for their products, so I started a yogurt 
production project with milk we purchased from 
the local farmers. To increase the involvement of 
our own personnel in this project, some of our 
disabled soldiers were trained to run the manu-
facturing process. The purchase of their milk was 
a great help for the farmers and their families, 
raised their incomes, and made them happy. We 
arranged to sell the yogurt at a nominal rate to 
the other military camps and made it available 
to our food supplier, who, in return, sent it back 
to the camp twice a week as dessert with other 
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BETWEEN THE LOCAL 
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND THE VILLAGERS.
rations. Similarly, we ordered several varieties of small fish from various sources 
and introduced them into the main tank (reservoir). Although this project took 
a long time to bring results, the fishermen in the area benefited in the long run. 
I also made arrangements to distribute 5,000 jackfruit plants among the farm 
families for cultivation.4
Helping People Help Themselves 
As mentioned earlier, I received permission from higher headquarters to engage 
the Sri Lankan Army Engineers to construct a minor road in my area. Apart 
from the engineers’ work clearing mines and conducting demolition in support 
of the resettlement process, their road and bridge development projects were 
much superior to those of civil contractors in terms of cost, time, and the quality 
of work. The army’s use of advanced technology and machinery, plus the fact 
that its workforce did not draw overtime and was not paid by an employer who 
needed to make a profit, considerably reduced the costs of construction. 
Yet the road construction that the engineers had carried out in the area so far 
was not sufficient to satisfy the needs and aspirations of the local Tamil people, 
so I made the request for another small road to be built. Surprisingly, however, 
this effort also negatively affected the villagers for a number of reasons. When a 
civilian contractor undertakes a project such as this, he rents housing, land, and 
other local resources, including laborers. The military, however, is self-sufficient 
in this respect. Consequently, villagers lose the opportunity to gain employment 
and supply the required resources for the project. It is important to be mindful 
of the sources of income for local people. Simply putting in a road will not 
satisfy all their needs and expectations. For this reason, I decided to stop using 
the army for road construction, and the project was continued by private sector 
organizations and NGOs, which recruited local villagers to carry out the work. 
This decision to allow the private sector and NGOs to get involved created favor-
able conditions for the villagers and simultaneously increased both their incomes 
and their commitment to development.
In this post-conflict situation, the government’s welfare projects extended to 
rebuilding religious and other civilian institutions, and again were conducted by 
the army. Our forces cleared and renovated hospitals, schools, religious sites, and 
other government institutions in order to improve living standards, establish a 
link with local leaders, and win the hearts and minds of the general public. 
The administrators of these local institutions also had a tendency to call in the 
security forces to conduct welfare services, perhaps because they knew that army 
personnel, who were noted for their discipline, would take up the challenge and 
complete the tasks efficiently. We realized, however, that taking over these kinds 
of jobs would not pay good dividends in terms of community relations. Con-
tinuous military engagement in the rebuilding of religious and social institutions 
disrupted the community’s active participation in its own religious and social af-
fairs. As a remedial measure, I coordinated with religious leaders in the area and 
had them organize some sramadhana (volunteer labor) in their area of control. 
We helped by supplying amenities such as water bowsers (tankers), transporta-
tion, and snacks, so that the volunteers could finish these jobs in good spirits 
and with camaraderie, and thereby remain involved. Our endeavor tremendously 
improved the relationship between the local social institutions and the villagers, 









The army, including my battalion, also carried out some housing construction 
projects for displaced and homeless people in the war-affected areas. The govern-
ment funded these projects with the help of some foreign and non-governmental 
organizations. When the army took over these projects, it did not give money 
directly to the homeowners or involve them in their own home construction, but 
simply went in and did the work. Some families were unhappy with this, due to 
a lack of personal satisfaction and sense of independence. Therefore, the villagers 
preferred the civilian government and non-governmental organizations to fulfill 
their housing needs. In most cases, people received cash from these sources to 
build their houses in stages and were highly committed to meeting their con-
struction goals in order to obtain successive cash grants. The masons, carpenters, 
and laborers involved in these projects were hired from among the villagers, and 
even the suppliers of building materials were locals. Furthermore, villagers were 
free to choose their own housing plans, which allowed them to save some of their 
building funds to spend on other needs. 
I was still eager to help these villagers. To supply their needs for inexpensive 
cement blocks to build their homes, I installed two machines for the production 
of this material. The project was able to meet local requirements, and the cost 
savings were passed on to the villagers. As a result, the villagers in our area were 
highly satisfied: they received their cement block supply at concessional rates 
and built their homes according to their own specifications. 
Improving Local Government, Civil Institutions, and Education 
The army was occasionally ordered by higher headquarters to involve itself 
directly with local administration by superseding local authorities, such as town 
councils, local councils, and various other state-sponsored welfare institutions. 
The military had the required leadership capacity and structure to complete proj-
ects more efficiently than could civil organizations, and its personnel were able to 
work around the clock to finish a task. Such successes caused further problems, 
however, because the civil authorities came to take it for granted that the military 
would be able to easily overcome every problem, even a natural disaster, without 
the involvement of the civilian sector. From my point of view, this negligence 
and lack of coordination by local government officials left a vacuum in the opera-
tional capacity of the civil organizations and created more havoc for the people. 
I therefore became a mediator for the local leaders to help them carry out their 
responsibilities and facilitate the effective functioning of their organizations.  
Our other main concern was to encourage the villagers to educate their children. 
Most families could not afford to purchase books, clothing, and other neces-
sary school supplies, and children were often required to look after the family’s 
cattle and help with other farming work instead of attending school. To improve 
the children’s educational prospects, I worked to get volunteers involved. My 
effort paid good dividends, and we received books, stationery, and clothing to 
distribute among the poor children of the village. In addition, I persuaded local 
religious leaders to talk to parents about their children’s academic needs. With 
the distribution of the necessary school supplies, parents felt encouraged and 
voluntarily made arrangements for the schooling of their children. Gradually, 
school attendance in the area increased. Due in some part to our work, the 
cultural, educational, and social aspects of the community began to show signs 
of improvement, and the villagers took increasing responsibility for their lives.
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Although most of the Sri Lankan army’s projects in Batticaloa Province were 
successful, complete success was elusive for many reasons. First, we had to 
develop a basic understanding of the people’s attitudes and concerns. Second, 
the military had difficulty convincing local officials to commit themselves to 
their work and take responsibility for restoring the smooth operation of the 
civil administration. Third, we needed to take into account the sources of local 
incomes, so that the direct involvement of military personnel in restoration 
projects would not deprive people of income from a variety of sources. Finally, 
we needed to make sure our presence and activity did not adversely affect the 
local people’s ability to organize as an independent, self-sustaining society. 
I gradually overcame these misjudgments by developing close connections with 
the people in my area and working to understand their aspirations and attitudes. 
I encouraged people to become committed to and responsible for their own 
lives. When a conflict ends and it is time to rehabilitate and reconstruct the basic 
infrastructure in war-torn areas, the military must be ready to cooperate with the 
government, NGOs, and civil organizations at every level, while bearing in mind 
the keys for success that I’ve outlined here. ²
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That Word Terrorist, and What Terrorists  
Say about It
Dr. Christopher C. Harmon,  
Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Cen-
ter for Security Studies
Prepare what force you can and cavalry to terrorize the enemies of 
God and your enemies.1
Armed with this Qur’anic verse, Karim Bourti, a member of the transnational 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in North Africa, explained his 
pride in considering himself “a Muslim terrorist,” saying he “loves” the model ter-
rorist of this new century.2 “All those who are sincere with Allah support Osama 
Bin Laden. Any Muslim who doesn’t love Bin Laden has hypocrisy in his heart.”
Algerian by birth, Bourti became a naturalized citizen of France in 2000 and 
spent years organizing international jihad from Paris, until he was stripped of his 
French citizenship in 2006. He told a journalist at length about his aggressive 
“mission to send young Muslims living in France to get killed abroad,” for which 
he collected thousands of francs, and later euros, at mosques or over the phone. 
He lectured young men on emulating the courage of those fighting in Chechnya 
and Palestine. He praised “martyrdom operations”—otherwise known as mass 
homicide bombings. His personal successes include recruiting Hervé Djamel 
Loiseau and Brahim Yadel, both of whom trained in the al Farouk camp in 
Afghanistan run by Osama bin Laden. Loiseau died in the Tora Bora mountains 
in the early weeks of the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, and Yadel landed in 
Guantanamo Bay detention.
Karim Bourti is an archetype of Islamist terrorism in our times: geographically 
deracinated but strongly ideological; an Algerian who plotted against his own 
government as well as that of his host country, France; a Muslim who schemed 
to kill Muslim clerics and politicians; and a member of the GSPC, which, like 
many disparate small Sunni groups, was later folded into al Qaeda. Bourti is 
murderous, but he claims to kill for “idealistic” reasons. He lived comfortably in 
the open, liberal democracy of France but was part of a clandestine organization 
that was working to wreck it. He came to France as a refugee from a war-torn 
North African country and as a citizen was protected by French police, yet he 
loathed France for being too secular and too supportive of the Algerian govern-
ment and for siding “too closely with the Americans.”3 
Some social scientists and theorists believe the use of the word terrorism reflects 
only the prejudices and self-interested opinions of “establishment” elites and 
Westerners. But Bourti is a proud terrorist who offered the opinions quoted 
above to an Algerian journalist, whom he mistook for an ally. Everything he 
said confirms the profound seriousness of the ideas behind terrorist acts and the 
global fight against international terrorism. Within one generation, our world 
has seen millennium bomb plots; the 9/11 attacks; devastating bombings in 
Ankara, Bali, and Casablanca; well-sequenced multiple explosions on transit sys-
tems in Britain and Spain; and “complex attacks” in which infantry tactics were 
used against the innocent in public places such as Mumbai, or were combined 
with improvised explosive devices, as is frequently done in Iraq. 
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The calculation required to accomplish all such killings 
is sometimes openly betrayed in the speech that frames 
terrorists’ assaults. Terrorists’ own words belie the pious 
excuses they typically offer for their actions. Yet hardly 
anyone who is studying the phenomenon of twenty-first-
century terrorism has noticed this disjunction.4 Even many 
scholars commonly repeat the dismissive 
cliché that “one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter.” Certain ter-
rorism analysts think it’s a safe assertion 
that no sub-state actor would ever accept 
the label terrorist for himself. But some 
of these actors embrace the label, and we 
should recognize that their admissions 
are important. 
Fourteen issues of the al Qaeda maga-
zine Inspire appeared between 2010 and 
2015, offering readers insight into the 
organization’s purposes and strategies. Inspire’s editors 
flagrantly deploy the very words (terrorist and terrorism) 
that some mainstream English-language media outlets 
discourage or forbid their own writers from using, to avoid 
inflaming readers. Qur’anic verses, such as the earlier quote 
beloved by Karim Bourti, and teachings relevant to terror-
ists from lesser sources in Islam appear throughout Inspire’s 
pages. Such teachings may take the narrow argumentative 
line of Osama bin Laden, that “good terrorism” is readily 
distinguished from “bad terrorism” by the virtuous inten-
tions of the jihadi perpetrators. This argument is also made 
in issue 12 (November 2015) of the Islamic State’s magazine 
Dabiq.5 
The Inspire editors present whole pages of exhortations to 
terrorism written by Abu Musab al-Suri, a deep student of 
Islamist militancy who is known primarily through his in-
ternet presence. His encyclopedic study The Call to Global 
Islamic Resistance argues, for example, that even a bomber 
not seeking salvation may still be praised, for “he terrorizes 
the enemy; that is good too, because this is the best of all 
spites and has benefits for Muslims.”6 After its initial issues, 
Inspire began saluting itself and its own fearless approach 
to political struggle by claiming to have inspired specific 
incidences of terrorism. For example, the September 2015 
issue offers an article on “Remembering Boston” and “the 
youth who terrorized the disbelievers” in their American 
homeland, referring to the two Tsarnaev brothers who 
carried out the bombing.7 The same issue also trumpets the 
death of a cartoonist named on Inspire’s earlier “wanted” 
lists.8 From the standpoint of criminal law or just common 
sense, that is known as a confession! 
In revolution or in any conflict, however rightful the cause, 
the intentional abuse of the innocent is reprehensible and 
is punishable under international humanitarian law and 
under several clear Security Council resolutions such as 
1373 (2001).9 Within any legitimate polity during peace-
time, if the people were to condone acts of terrorism done 
on their behalf, they would have to 
abandon moral logic and humanity and 
surrender the public space meant for 
sane debate and healthy disagreement 
in politics.10 But terrorists choose the 
weapon of fear purposefully, knowing 
that the power to shock is one they 
want to wield. If we listen, we often hear 
the killers themselves saying—some-
times quietly, sometimes boldly—that 
they understand this tool of terrorism, 
they respect its power, and they rely on 
it to achieve their goals. Although we 
may not trust terrorists’ words, the words themselves often 
belie the notion that terrorism is a meaningless term. 
Early Uses of the Term Terrorist
Arguments in favor of terrorism had been developed by 
nineteenth-century European anarchists, many of whom 
despised religion. The highly moralistic Russian anarchist 
Alexei Petrovich Kropotkin wanted attacks to focus on 
infamous despots and known torturers among the police. 
But even he accepted the bold and shocking acts of 
“insanity” carried out by other anarchists, because the ideas 
of these “madmen” would seep into other men’s minds and 
win converts to the anarchist cause.11 Assassinations won 
praise for being destabilizing. Sergey Nechaev’s Catechism 
of the Revolutionist (1869) called for targeting the “cleverest 
and most energetic figures” in government “to shatter 
its strength.”12 He warned against pity while praising 
“merciless destruction.” In 1880, while in Geneva, Russian 
revolutionary Nikolai Morozov published an exhortation 
to “terroristic revolution.”13 His praise of terrorism noted 
“this advantage that it can act unexpectedly and find 
means and ways which no one anticipates. … All that the 
terroristic struggle really needs is a small number of people 
and large material means.” Still other anarchists of that 
era mocked any discrimination in the selection of targets 
and approved of all violence, including petty crime, for 
the damage it could do to society generally.14 All acts were 
“good” if they helped to make governance impossible—the 
strategic goal of anarchism. A German immigrant to 
America, Johannes Most, was a dynamite enthusiast and 
relished the fear that explosions could incite in people. He 
not only preached in favor of such attacks for years but 
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also published a newspaper, Freiheit (Freedom), in which he called on fellow 
anarchists to carry them out. One 1884 article by Most was simply titled “Advice 
for Terrorists.”15
Perhaps the single most influential book in modern terrorism studies is Alistair 
Horne’s A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962.16 In it, Horne explains how 
moderate Algerian nationalists were ignored, used, or misused by hardliners 
in the National Liberation Front (FLN), the main opposition group. The group 
began its campaign to expel the French colonial regime in Algeria through 
politics and guerrilla warfare against the French security forces, both of which 
can be seen as legitimate avenues in the context of anti-colonial revolution. 
The FLN also used limited acts of terrorism against certain loyalist Algerians. 
Within two years of the conflict’s outbreak, however, a more muscular position 
was staked out by fierce revolutionaries such as Abane Ramdane, who relished 
the slogan, “One corpse in a [dinner] jacket is always worth more than 20 in 
uniform.”17 That slogan embodies a strategy adopted by the FLN that broke the 
laws of warfare and led directly to infamous plastique (IED) attacks on popular 
cafés and the bombing of a dance hall that left girls and boys with missing legs 
lying on a burning floor. When psychoanalyst and FLN propagandist Frantz 
Fanon wrote essays defending such shocking violence, illegitimate belligerents 
everywhere were encouraged.18 Some came to Algiers from abroad in 1962 for 
the FLN victory celebrations at the end of the war. 
Decisions by Muslim extremists to use purposeful cruelty against civilians must 
not be confused with mainstream Islamic faith. Algeria is a Muslim nation, 
but the FLN were, above all, nationalists, and some members were secular. The 
strenuously religious cadres among them were either marginalized or absorbed. 
Terrorism in the Modern Era
In the mid-twentieth century, exhortations to terrorism came from a different 
ideological center. Brazilian Marxist Carlos Marighella wrote his Minimanual of 
the Urban Guerrilla in 1969, in which he argued for terrorist acts, including bank 
robberies, to shake “capitalism’s nerve system.”19 Marighella used the word ter-
rorismo to promote acts of violence as a means to effect “irreparable loss against 
the enemy.” Acts of terror, he wrote, should be executed with “the greatest cold-
bloodedness.” He concluded, “Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never 
relinquish.”20 Marighella died in a shootout with police later the same year. But 
his manual became celebrated, widely translated, and deeply influential. 
Osama bin Laden rarely used the word terrorism unless it was in an accusation 
against others. He declared that Western media terrorize their own consumers, 
implanting fear and helplessness.21 Yet even bin Laden, in a video he made 
months after the attacks against American targets on 9/11, characterized these as 
“benevolent terrorism”22 intended to force the United States to abandon Israel. 
In a message to Taliban leader Mullah Omar that was found on an al Qaeda 
computer in Afghanistan, bin Laden crowed that most Americans were suffering 
psychological problems following the attacks on their cities. 
The fatwa that bin Laden issued on 23 February 1998 calling for jihad against 
Jews and Westerners is now infamous, but little attention was paid to it at the 
time of publication. The fatwa was signed by an international array of six Muslim 
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terrorist leaders, including the head of the Egyptian group 
Al Jihad, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who now leads al Qaeda. The 
document claimed religious inspiration for bin Laden’s 
order, which repudiated the established global practice 
of seeking to limit fighting to declared belligerents: “The 
ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and 
military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who 
can do it in any country.”23 In a propaganda statement he 
delivered three months later, titled “The Nuclear Bomb 
of Islam,” bin Laden declared that “it is the duty of the 
Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize 
the enemies of God.”24
Terrorism is also the explicit objective of two different 
al Qaeda training manuals discovered in the years prior to 
the 9/11 attacks. The first, found in the early 1990s, filled 
11 volumes. Along with a flood of pages on tradecraft, 
there was an exhortation to practitioners to assassinate 
prominent Arab leaders and to kill as many as possible 
in Western lands, at events such as Christmas gatherings. 
Institutions, clubs, and hospitals in Jewish communities 
should be carefully chosen to cause as many deaths as 
possible. A second manual consisting of about 180 pages 
was found in Manchester, England, in May 2000.25 It 
denounces “apostate” Arab rulers, Jews, 
and others; repeatedly urges violent ac-
tions to create fear; and advises on such 
means as poison and explosives, among 
other weapons. Explicitly mocking 
“Socratic debates [and] Platonic ideals,” 
the manual exhorts “the ideals of assas-
sination, bombing, and destruction.” It 
claims that holy text and commentary 
support this jihad, including this 
Qur’anic passage: “Strike terror into the enemies of Allah 
and your enemies, and others besides whom ye may not 
know, but whom Allah doth know.”26
While doubts remain about Ramzi Ahmed Yousef ’s ties 
to al Qaeda, many analysts believe he was acting for the 
then five-year-old organization when he directed the 1993 
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. A 
truck bomb, placed in the parking garage under one tower, 
was intended to topple that tower against the other. While 
it failed to accomplish that goal, six people were killed, 
1,000 were injured, and as late as 2006, thousands of 
others were reported to have developed respiratory diseases 
from the blast. At his hearing, Yousef boasted: “Yes, I am a 
terrorist and I am proud of it.” That line was re-quoted in a 
feature story on Yousef in Inspire.27 
Within the larger international militant Islamist commu-
nity, there are other confreres and allies just as outspoken 
as Yousef. One is a Syrian-born Londoner named Omar 
Bakri Muhammad, who is the founder of the city’s branch 
of Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party). He had 
warned of a big al Qaeda operation in London a year 
before the 7 July 2005 bombing of four London subway 
trains (the attack now known as 7/7). In an interview with 
a Portuguese magazine, Bakri extolled terrorism as a tool. 
We don’t make a distinction between civilians 
and noncivilians, innocents and nonbelievers. 
Only between Muslims and nonbelievers. 
And the life of a nonbeliever has no value. … 
We don’t say, ‘I’m sorry, it was a mistake.’ We 
say ‘You deserved it.’ We assume the purpose 
is to kill as many people as possible, to spread 
the terror [to] people in the West. … Terror 
is the language of the 21st century. If I want 
something, I terrorize you to achieve it.28 
Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, an Egyptian extremist who 
was tried in Italy in 2006, allegedly kept and shared extensive 
video and audio files of jihadi materials, including a song 
with the lyrics: “We are terrorists, we want 
to make it known to the world, from 
West to East that we are terrorists, because 
terrorism, as a verse of the Qur’an says, is a 
thing approved by God.”29 Another file, 
a “Poem for Jihadists,” merely repeated 
again and again, “I am a terrorist; I 
am a terrorist.”30 Another example of a 
proud sponsor of terrorism is Dr. Yusuf 
Abdullah Al-Qaradawi, a bank man-
ager and shareholder in the bank Al Taqwa. Interviewed 
in 1999 by the Palestine Times, Al-Qaradawi advocated 
operations in which a “Muslim fighter turns himself or 
herself into a human bomb that casts terror in the hearts of 
the enemy.”31 He called for financial and moral support for 
such acts.32
Conclusion
Some in the counterterrorism community have a profound 
analytical problem because they cannot understand the 
open advocacy of attacks on the innocent in attempts to 
create a general condition of fear. The word terrorism is no 
mere label but the description of a reality. Understanding 
what extremist Islamic terrorists tell us is part of under-
standing their strategies. If we can do that, we will under-
stand much more about what their regime may be like 
should they succeed in their quest for a global caliphate. 
AT HIS HEARING, 
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It is always possible that these terrorists will “reform” once in power and turn 
to governance. But it is equally possible that their terrorism against actual and 
perceived opponents will only get worse, as happened in the case of the Khmer 
Rouge regime in Cambodia.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s ISIS thugs boast of terrorizing their enemies—foreign 
and domestic—in order to maintain rule in the “caliphate.” When ISIS’s chief 
spokesman, Abu Mohammed al Adnani, railed at length against Shi’a Muslims, 
Yazidis, Christians, Jews, and others in an address he gave on 22 September 2014, 
he sounded like a fascist orator of the 1930s.33 It was obvious that his words were 
meant to justify the continuous murders, maimings, and menacing ISIS was 
carrying out against members of these groups in the territories it controlled. 
Self-satisfaction about “terrorizing” and “humiliating” enemies drips off the 
full-color pages of Dabiq, the disturbing ISIS magazine. After the attacks in Paris 
in November 2015, the e-zine’s cover story was “Just Terror”—terrorism that is 
just.34 The story’s text lauded terrorism for Allah’s sake and demanded credit for the 
Paris attacks and the downing of a Russian passenger jet over Egypt in October.
Terrorism, as the words of perpetrators remind us, is about demonstrating 
power. It is a strategy for wielding power in politics, even when religious, 
anarchistic, or other motives are proclaimed more loudly. The terrorists’ own 
words should be prompts to our global community: vicious and inhumane 
approaches to politics must always be avoided, deterred, and countered with 
reasonable human ideals. ²
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Three Ghosts Who Haunt Modern Strategy Dr. John Arquilla,  US Naval Postgraduate School
I see dead strategists. 
Let me help you see them, too. For just a moment, avert your gaze from the 
latest Islamic State attacks and atrocities. Instead, concentrate along with me on 
catching a glimpse of the three ghosts who haunt the halls of the US Pentagon 
and the central military administrations of most developed nations—the three 
ghosts who drive policy in costly, counterproductive directions and keep much 
of the world in a permanent state of chaos. 
The most senior specter is that of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), whose bril-
liant early campaigns gave way, as his power grew, to a series of increasingly bloody 
slugging matches between massive armies, epitomized by the carnage of Borodino, 
the most Pyrrhic of his victories.1 British strategist Basil Liddell Hart observed 
that Napoleon had “pinned his faith to mass” and had even inspired the influential 
Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, to become “the Mahdi of Mass,” 
as Liddell Hart dubbed him.2 US General Colin Powell’s eponymous doctrine 
of “overwhelming force”—still regnant in most strategic circles—reflects 
the enduring power of the ghost of Napoleon and is responsible for the 
trillions of dollars wasted in Afghanistan and Iraq over more than a 
dozen years. The Mahdi of Mass and his heirs are all but irrelevant in 
the face of today’s reality of terrorism and insurgency. 
In the United States, the ghost of Napoleon has haunted leaders 
of both major political parties until they have agreed to 
lavish trillions more dollars on the Pentagon in the coming 
years—despite simultaneous stern demands on both sides 
for more fiscal austerity. The remedy to failures in the field, 
as Napoleon’s spirit still whispers more than 200 
years after the disaster of the Russian Campaign 
and his undoing at Waterloo, is to add more 
of everything. Not one to accept a call to 
negotiate peace even after leaving hun-
dreds of thousands of his troops dead 
across Russia, the French emperor had 
raised yet another massive army—and 
quickly lost it in the great “Battle of the 
Nations” at Leipzig.3 Napoleon’s first 
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The second spirit hovering over strategic affairs today is that 
of US Army Brigadier General Billy Mitchell (1879–1936), 
an early apostle of modern air power. Almost a century 
ago, in the decades between the two world wars, then-
Colonel Mitchell held that swift offensive strikes from 
the sky could bring enemies to heel without the need for 
land or naval action. Like so many evangelists, Mitchell 
suffered for his beliefs, including a court martial convic-
tion for insubordination. But within a few short years, his 
ideas had captured the imagination of senior military and 
political leaders around the world. 
As a result of Billy Mitchell’s crusade, air power has been 
used repeatedly over the last 75 years with the explicit 
aim of “bombing to win,” in the words of University of 
Chicago professor Robert Pape.4 The current war against 
ISIS is highly dependent on aerial bombing, and the Saudis 
have applied Billy Mitchell’s formula to their air campaign 
in Yemen. Almost all such efforts have failed—including 
the counter-ISIS air war and the Saudi bomber offensive 
against Yemen’s insurgent Houthis—but the ghost of Billy 
Mitchell still hovers over headquarters planners, cockpit 
and drone pilots, and the high councils of all too many 
nations, luring them on, siren-like.
The third apparition haunting global strategy and policy 
is that of Osama bin Laden (1957–2011). The man who 
started history’s first great war between nations and 
networks is only five years dead, yet it is already clear that 
he is—in an ominously Dickensian sense—the ghost of 
conflicts to come. His demise seems only to have scattered 
the seeds of networked insurgency and terrorism—old 
and new—across the globe: from a resurgent Taliban in 
Afghanistan to al Qaeda “franchises” everywhere; from 
the quickly metastasizing ISIS splinter group in Syria and 
Iraq to Boko Haram in Nigeria; from Jemaah Islamiya and 
the Abu Sayyaf group in Southeast Asia to Hizb ut-Tahrir 
around the globe. The list goes on and on, with countless 
small cells—such as those that spawned recent attacks in 
Paris and Brussels—operating throughout Europe and the 
rest of the world. 
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Aside from having set the course for globally networked 
terrorism, Osama bin Laden has, with his death, done 
much to keep counterterrorist strategy firmly misdirected. 
For if Napoleon’s ghost encourages an over-reliance on 
sheer force, and Billy Mitchell’s spirit wails “No boots on 
the ground!” Osama bin Laden’s spectral presence deceives 
many around the world into thinking that the assassina-
tion of terrorist leaders can bring their organizations to the 
verge of strategic defeat, as former US Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta was wont to say.5
Nothing could be further from the truth. The so-called 
Global War on Terror has morphed into terror’s war on 
the world. And the ghost of bin Laden no doubt smiles a 
chilling smile at the notion that counterterrorist efforts to 
defeat networks can succeed by taking out their “leaders,” 
such as Abu Sayyaf, the ISIS oilman killed last year in an 
American special operations raid in eastern Syria, and ISIS’s 
number two man, Mustafa al-Qaduli, who was killed this 
past March.6 The greatest strength of networks lies, after 
all, in their members’ ability to pursue a common goal 
without much (if any) central control. Failure to appreciate 
this is the first step on the path to defeat—at ruinous cost. 
In sum, Napoleon’s haunting presence keeps alive the 
doomed, darkening strategic dreams of victory by sheer 
force of numbers. Billy Mitchell’s spirit still conjures up 
enchanting images of the potential to conduct successful 
campaigns with clinical detachment and from a safe 
distance. These ghosts of wars past and present cripple our 
efforts to cope with the realities imposed by bin Laden’s 
prescient vision of conflicts to come. 
All three ghosts must find their rest if there is to be any 
chance of forestalling an age of perpetual warfare in which 
global defense policies are tethered to strategies that prove 
ever more costly and ever less effective. But what is needed 
to end the haunting is not a Jennifer Love Hewitt–like 
“ghost whisperer.” 7 Instead of whispers, a loud, lively 
discourse among the living must unfold. The ravening Na-
poleonic appetite for more, toujours more, must be quelled. 
Mitchell’s keening call for precision bombing from afar 
must be heard as the siren’s song that it is. And finally, the 
obsession over taking out enemy “leaders” like bin Laden 
should simply be eliminated from strategic planning.
Once free from all this haunting, global counterterrorism 
efforts may finally focus on the two true lessons of warfare 
in our time: (1) Small, internationally-networked teams 
on the ground can greatly improve the effectiveness of air 
power; and (2) a shift in focus from eliminating leaders to 
illuminating network nodes and cells—and then striking 
them at many points at the most opportune moment—will 
have truly lasting effects. 
Perhaps, if shifts of this sort are made, I’ll stop seeing dead 
strategists. ²
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THE CTAP INTERVIEW
Dr. Letitia Lawson and Colonel (Ret.) Eugene 
Michael Mensch, US Naval Postgraduate School
Interviewed by Nicholas Tomb,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 Dr. Letitia Lawson teaches courses on 
security, government and politics, history, and cultures in Africa. She frequently 
travels to the African continent as a faculty member for the Center for Civil-
Military Relations (CCMR). Colonel Michael Mensch, former Africa program 
manager for CCMR, is currently a consultant on African affairs. On 8 December 
2015, Nick Tomb talked with Dr. Lawson and COL Mensch about security and 
counterterrorism across the African continent.2
NICHOLAS TOMB: To begin with, what’s your big-picture analysis of how 
the continent is doing today and its prospects for security and development in 
the future? 
DR. LETITIA LAWSON: Africa is an extremely big continent, and it’s going 
in many different directions at the same time. In some obvious places, like the 
Central African Republic [CAR], things are not getting better. In other places, 
like Ethiopia and Rwanda, the economies are growing quickly. Some countries 
are in fact doing extremely well economically, and I think that the success of 
those is likely to affect the rest of the continent, although a lot of the economic 
growth in the region is still driven by commodity prices. Africa was largely unaf-
fected by the 2008 financial crisis because it is disconnected from that part of the 
global economy, but its economic progress as a region is very much driven by, 
or related to, trade with China. As China’s economic growth has now slowed, 
exports to China have slowed, and as a result, growth projections have declined 
for the continent as a whole. The main thing going forward, in terms of both the 
economies and the security of Africa’s countries, is to appreciate their diversity. 
On the security front, I am quite optimistic about the medium to long term. 
What has struck me most in the last 10 years is the extent to which the more 
capable African countries are beginning to behave like everybody else in the 
international system. Governments are using their security forces to pursue state 
interests as they see them. In some cases this can be destabilizing. For example, 
in 1996 and 1998, Rwanda and Uganda used their security forces to invade the 
DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] to address what they saw as their security 
interests. Similarly, Ethiopia and Kenya have assumed responsibility for AMISOM 
[the African Union Mission to Somalia] largely as a means of securing their own 
borders.
There have been relatively few international security threats in Africa in the 
last 50 years—or in the last 100 years, really, since the colonial occupation. But 
now, the African countries are becoming more vulnerable to external threats of 
various kinds, and I think that is leading the stronger countries to think more 
seriously about their own security and the security of their regions. This is going 
to change the dynamic on the continent as a whole in a good way, over the me-
dium to long term. In the short term, these developments are not going to affect 
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the challenges facing CAR, DRC, and other troubled countries, but I think that, 
in the longer term, the region will finally move out of the post-colonial period 
and become self-sustaining, in terms of economic growth and development and 
security. The region is coming into its own. 
COL MICHAEL MENSCH: We are talking about 54 different nation-states 
in Africa, so we are bound to generalize, but even where you see significant 
macro growth in the big picture, not every citizen is benefiting from that growth. 
Not to say there has not been some improvement, but still, the individual 
African’s security is a human security challenge. I think there is still a long way 
to go toward ensuring that the gains at the national level reach the citizenry. The 
security versus development question is the classic chicken-and-egg question—I 
think you need both. To draw another comparison between state security and 
human security, individual security begins with the state. Even the wealthiest 
of the states run out of resources before they can ensure security at the human 
level. I think that if governments begin with individual security rather than with 
state or regime security, their people overall would be better off. But this would 
require that resources—both national resources and foreign aid—get utilized 
in the way in which they were intended to be utilized, and for the benefit of the 
people rather than being absorbed by various bureaucracies. 
LAWSON: In terms of utilizing resources as intended, it is worth noting 
that Nigeria, for instance, is full of reformers, people who want to do the right 
thing, but it takes a whole bunch of people like that working together to address 
structural, organizational, and interest-based obstacles to better resource utiliza-
tion. Nigeria has some way to go, but it also now has a president [Muhammadu 
Buhari] whom people are very excited about. Buhari has long been committed 
to fighting corruption as well as defeating Boko Haram. Those are the first steps 
towards development as far as many Nigerians are concerned, and I think they 
are right about that. Again, I am cautiously optimistic. 
MENSCH: I think you have to look at the nature of the government. In 
Rwanda, for instance, the government has had a key role in ensuring the coun-
try’s tidiness, orderliness, economic development, and the well-being of the 
people. If these things are better in Rwanda, however, they have come at a price. 
That price is that you’re basically dealing with a police state: your life is going 
to be good as long as you don’t make waves. If you make waves and resist the 
government, your life can be affected whenever and however the government 
wants. So there can be a trade-off for all of this good order and development  
that some people may not be interested in making.
TOMB: Terrorism is clearly a huge challenge facing Africa, with al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] attacking in the north and al Shabaab attacking in 
the east. Additionally, Boko Haram, which operates in northern Nigeria and 
the Lake Chad region, was recently named the world’s deadliest terrorist group, 
having killed over 6,600 people in 2014, which is more than ISIS killed that year.3 
How serious is the threat of terrorism in Africa, and what can African govern-
ments and the international community do about it?
LAWSON: I would start with a definition of terrorism, because terrorism is 
simply a tactic. So let’s say terrorism is the use or threat of violence against civil-
ians in pursuit of a political goal.
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When you use violence against the government for a political goal, for example 
when al Shabaab uses terrorism to attack AMISOM or the Somali government, 
that is still an asymmetrical conflict. The goal is to defeat an enemy, not to per-
suade a government to change its policies. In contrast, the Shabaab attack on the 
Westgate mall in Nairobi in 2013 was classic terrorism: the goal was to persuade 
the Kenyan government to withdraw its forces from Somalia. These groups don’t 
have the capacity to use other tactics, so they use this tactic regardless of the 
goal. Boko Haram is an insurgency. It has used terrorist tactics in the past and 
is returning to them now because it has been rolled back by government and 
neighboring armed forces. Early on, Boko Haram attacked police stations and 
robbed banks as a way of accumulating fighting resources, but it did not attack 
the civilian population as such. The organization evolved into a clear insurgency 
movement after its leader was killed in police custody—basically murdered by 
the Nigerian state.4 So it makes sense that it would become very deadly because 
it is now an army. The Nigerian Army is not very capable and in the past cer-
tainly did not feel the need to be prepared to take on this kind of threat. Boko 
Haram captured a lot of equipment from the Nigerian Army, which allowed it 
to become an expanding insurgency with basically the same level of capability as 
the army. As it has been rolled back, it has fallen back on classic terrorism, with 
attacks on the civilian population that are designed to delegitimize the Nigerian 
state.
The Army now has an insurgent force fighting them with their own weapons and 
with close to 10,000 fighters at one point. Boko Haram is a particular kind of in-
surgency, and it does kill more civilians. It is not going for a “hearts-and-minds” 
campaign. My general point is that Boko Haram is or wants to be associated 
with a transnational terrorist network, but in at least some of the periods of Onlookers flee at the sound of gunfire at Westgate Mall, 23 September 2013.
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its development, the tactics that Boko Haram used were 
much more those of an insurgency than these targeted or 
general terrorist attacks we see now. 
Like Boko Haram, AQIM historically has not been a 
significant threat to Africa or even to Mali. Over the last 
10 years or so, since the group has been in Mali, AQIM’s 
fighters have sat out there in the desert hills. They have 
been primarily involved in kidnaping for ransom and 
then using that money to buy weapons, so they were stock-
piling money and weapons but otherwise are just sitting 
there. AQIM is not a very big organization, and it is still 
largely an Algerian organization. In the same way that al 
Shabaab associated itself with al Qaeda when Shabaab 
was weak and falling apart, so AQIM’s predecessor, the 
Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, did 
this as a way of trying to reinvigorate itself. [AQIM leader 
Mokhtar] Belmokhtar was a cigarette smuggler. Moving 
things across borders is what keeps economies going out 
there in the desert. In my viewpoint, there is nothing 
particularly unusual or threatening about smuggling 
economies that have been active for decades. 
If you look at the population distribu-
tion of Mali, 90 percent of the popula-
tion lives in the southern third of the 
country. The Mali government has 
never lost control over this area. The 
remaining 10 percent of the population 
lives in the other two-thirds of Mali, and 
some 80 to 90 percent of those people 
live in a few towns. So most of Mali is 
effectively empty. With regard to AQIM 
sitting out there in the desert, the Malian government 
had said, essentially, “Those of you who have an issue or 
a problem with AQIM, go ahead and try to deal with it 
because we have issues of our own and AQIM is not really 
doing anything to us.” The government was right about 
that. Similarly, ethnic Tuareg rebellions are more or less 
perennial: they keep coming back about every 10 years. 
I think it’s important to remember that before the most 
recent Tuareg attack in Mali [beginning in January 2012], 
the conventional wisdom was that Mali was dealing 
with them in exactly the right way. There was a tendency 
among observers to criticize Niger for being so beefy and 
militaristic, whereas Mali was praised for decentralizing 
and power-sharing and doing all kinds of nice stuff—pro-
moting autonomy in the region. Suddenly, with northern 
Mali falling to the MNLA [National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad] and Ansare Dine [which provided 
the personal and organizational links between AQIM and 
MNLA] in 2012, this policy looks like a mistake. 
But this is because AQIM is sitting there on a bunch of 
money and weapons, and then the Libyan state collapses. 
Who anticipated that? When Qaddafi fell, armed Malians 
who had been working in the Libyan presidential guard 
or were otherwise supported by Qaddafi came back to 
Mali with equipment and armaments that they would 
never, under any other circumstances, have had. The 
governments of both Niger and Mali were saying to 
NATO: “Please don’t intervene in Libya, we don’t need 
to hurry this rebellion on. Our countries are going to 
absorb the cost if you do.” And they did. So I don’t know 
how much of a threat AQIM itself really is. It is there, and 
it was able to provide the extra funding and weaponry 
that facilitated Ansare Dine’s success, so in that particular 
context, it was a significant threat. Whether it can expand 
and threaten other countries remains to be seen. In recent 
months, AQIM has begun to carry out classic terror attacks 
in West Africa on the heels of the more spectacular ISIS 
attacks in Europe, perhaps to remind us that al Qaeda still 
exists. In the long run, these terrorist threats might be a 
good thing, if the region’s governments feel sufficiently 
threatened to begin taking security more seriously. 
In most post-colonial African countries, 
the army has been the biggest threat 
to any sitting president. So if you’re 
the president, rationality tells you that 
you don’t want the army to be too 
professional, too capable. Instead, it 
becomes an institution for distributing 
patronage. So it’s not surprising that the 
Malian army collapsed in 2012 in the 
face of the Tuareg separatist–Islamist 
insurgency, and it’s not surprising that the Nigerian 
Army had a really hard time dealing with Boko Haram. 
But I think the level of threat indicates not so much the 
strength of those threatening organizations but rather the 
weakness of the state military institutions. If the govern-
ments and the leaders of those institutions respond to 
these threats by increasing their own capabilities, then 
I think it will not be that difficult for them to roll the 
insurgents back. In the short term, it’s hard to predict, 
however, whether they will do so or the extent to which 
they will do so. I would expect that not much will be done 
in Mali because their problem has been solved for them. 
France and the UN are taking care of the insurgency, so 
the incentives for Mali’s government and military to get 
serious about security may be lower than for Nigeria. In 
any case, they are never going to be able to defend a big 
piece of virtually uninhabited desert out there. 
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Nigeria, in contrast, needs to, and actually can, control all of its own territory. 
Nigeria is not a desert; it is a country of 140 million people. The little corner 
of the country where Boko Haram operates is more sparsely populated, but the 
country as a whole is relatively densely populated. I think that with the correct 
sort of stimulus, the Nigerian government and armed forces should be able 
to make the kinds of changes they need to become more effective. 
On the other side of the continent, al Shabaab is essentially contained. The 
international naval presence off the coast has mostly eliminated the piracy threat. 
Kenya and Ethiopia are now sealing off their borders with Somalia. Across the 
center of the country you have what the BBC calls “pro-government militias” 
supported by Ethiopia, which are basically a way for Ethiopia to operate through 
Somali proxies. Somalia’s neighbors have mostly sealed in the al Shabaab threat. 
Kenya is still threatened by Shabaab because Shabaab recruits quite effectively 
in Kenya, and it will continue to be an actual terrorist threat there. In the longer 
term, I think this could actually be a good thing, because it is creating a sense 
of cohesion in Kenya. The fight against al Shabaab can be divisive on religious 
grounds of course, but it’s really challenging the Kenyan government and 
security forces to be more effective in their intelligence, especially internally. 
The Kenyan media are among the best in the region. They report on what’s 
going on, and civil society has a chance to think about this situation. Asking the 
question, “What is this threat to us as Kenyans?” is actually useful in creating 
a cohesive national identity in the long run. If you are a target, if you are in the 
Westgate mall shopping when Shabaab shows up, you don’t care about the long 
run.5 But the government can use such threats to help build better state-society 
relations and stronger security institutions. 
MENSCH: The short-term answer to your specific question—how serious is 
the threat of terrorism for Africa—depends on where you are in Africa and who 
you are in Africa. There is no guarantee that your country is not going to be 
targeted, if for no other reason than because the bad guys can attack you. I would 
imagine that every African state is paying more attention now and considers 
terrorism a threat to its people, if not to the state itself. So I think the awareness 
is high and terrorism is seen as a serious threat by most governments in Africa. 
What can African governments do about it? In principle, this is the same every-
where: first of all, they need to develop good sources of information, a 
good intelligence network. Here is where a more authoritarian government 
may have an advantage if it has a well-developed internal and external intel-
ligence apparatus—especially internal. This kind of government may have better 
access to information about what’s going on in the far-flung areas of the country 
as well as in the capital. But once you collect information, you have to know 
what you want to do with it, which brings in another whole layer of intel-
ligence processing : translating information into intelligence that leaders can 
use for policy and decision-making purposes. Beyond the analysis, you then have 
to be able to do something about it. We—the international community—are 
speaking with one voice now: We want to eliminate the threat on the ground 
Opposite: Scenes from Asokoro section of Abuja, Nigeria, 2015: (top) a young man on the street; (bottom) a group of young women.
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and in the air. We want to kill these people before they kill 
us. We want to put them out of business. 
That’s one side of it, but then, as if that’s not difficult 
enough, the more problematic side is that for every one 
of these terrorists—or criminals, or whatever you want to 
call them—that we kill, we potentially create an extended 
family of more martyrs who are willing to take up the call, 
however illogical it may seem to us. Since the creation 
of the state of Israel, we have had an angry, even 
desperate population of Arabs who feel that they have 
been systemically disenfranchised in this process. This 
frustration has finally boiled over to the point that we 
are at today. We can argue the morality or the legality 
of deciding that we, the United States or the interna-
tional community, can take unilateral actions anywhere in 
the world to fight the terrorists or to preclude a terrorist 
attack, but that doesn’t address the bigger picture. I think 
that whether it’s terrorism or economic development or 
security cooperation in general, we need to ask questions 
rather than provide solutions. We want 
to let the Africans lead the process in 
their country or sub-region. The initia-
tive needs to come from our “client,” the 
people and government we are trying 
to help. My feeling is that we need to be 
very careful about how we approach this 
situation with African countries. We can 
do certain things for them, but there are 
some things we can’t do—such as find 
[Lord’s Resistance Army leader] Joseph 
Kony—or are not willing to do—such 
as put US conventional forces into the 
fight against Boko Haram. The United States’ relationship 
with any African country is not going to be the same as 
that country’s relationship with a former colonial power 
like France, Belgium, or Great Britain. It’s going to be very 
difficult for the United States to play more than a support 
role in fighting terrorism in Africa. 
Finally, we all need to address the ideological, economic, 
and social causes of terrorism.
LAWSON: It is important to put terrorism in the 
context of other threats. In the United States, we have the 
luxury of having terrorism be perhaps our most significant 
security threat. African countries do not have that luxury; 
they have a lot of other threats that are more important. 
We define security broadly to include human security. In 
the same time period when several hundred people were 
killed by terrorist attacks in Mali and two-thirds of the 
country came under the insurgents’ control, do you know 
how many African kids died of malaria? Hundreds of 
thousands. 
Even in terms of violent security threats, it seems to me 
that the biggest threat of violence in the modal African 
country comes from unemployment. Unemployed people 
may be recruited to terrorism, but they may be recruited 
to other forms of violence, too, because they have nothing 
to do. They are frustrated, so the salary it takes to recruit 
them into an organization, regardless of what the organi-
zation stands for, is relatively low. The satisfaction they get 
from feeling as if they are a part of something is substan-
tial, it seems to me, because they don’t get that satisfaction 
out of anything else. So even to the extent that govern-
ments see terrorism as a serious threat, they still need to be 
investing primarily in health and education and economic 
development. 
TOMB: That’s a perfect segue into the 
next question. Observers often note a 
correlation between underdevelopment, 
civil conflict, failing states, and acts of 
terrorism. Do you see development as 
an effective and legitimate means for 
countering terrorism? If these young 
people you are talking about have a 
job, if they feel like they are included 
in their community and their society, 
will that prevent them from turning to 
terrorism?
LAWSON: In the long run, development absolutely is 
the answer. In the short run, there is no way to employ all 
of those people who need jobs. But addressing structural 
unemployment is not even a generational problem, it’s a 
problem for the century. The dilemma is how to address 
root causes, which are clearly economic. So you have to 
start now, and as far as I am concerned, you have to make 
development your number one priority. But even if you do 
that, it doesn’t mean that you’re going to stop the threat 
of terrorism in your lifetime, and certainly not in the next 
election cycle or even in the next generation. Economic 
development is the long-term solution, but while you 
are pursuing a long-term solution, you absolutely need 




NOT A GENERATIONAL 
PROBLEM, IT’S 
A PROBLEM FOR 
THE CENTURY.




CTX | Vol. 6, No. 2
May 2016
53
MENSCH: Development and counterterrorism need to be done hand in hand. 
But I also think that the question of security is too often seen as involving only 
the state. As we have said, security now includes so many things: economic, 
social, and health issues as well as defense-related issues. Depending on how 
pressing the security issues are for a state, they can affect the government’s ability 
to focus on development, if indeed security is not already consuming all of the 
state’s resources. So how can we do these two things, security and development, at 
the same time? Obviously we cannot solve this in the short term, as Letitia said.  
But we need to do something to make as many people as possible feel secure 
in their own homes. In my experience, Africans don’t expect a lot from their 
governments because they haven’t gotten a lot from their governments. They 
would be happy if they were just left alone to farm, to educate, clothe, and feed 
their children. They vote people into office—there is democracy. The developed 
countries have jammed it down everybody’s throat, for good reason and with 
good intentions in most cases. But as someone said, you can’t eat democracy. The 
disinterest people have in their own governments contributes to a lack of security 
and a lack of government accountability at all levels, and this indifference also af-
fects the development of communities from the village level up through the state 
level. People are disinterested because their interest has never been appreciated, 
whether at the ballot box or within the governments itself. Interestingly enough, 
I think one of the biggest shifts in Africa in the last 20 years has been the emer-
gence of civil society as a recognized player in the governance process—accepted 
and recognized, albeit with some caution—by states and the international 
community. Civil societies have done a reasonably credible job of linking the 
people at all levels to their government at all levels. This may be a bright spot, but 
it is still overshadowed by the unequal distribution of wealth and lack of security 
at all levels, including the state. If the state is feeling threatened, that’s all officials 
are going to think about. 
TOMB: In your opinion, is corruption a contributor to terrorism and insecu-
rity, or is that taking it too far? What role does corruption play?
MENSCH: Corruption gets in the way of a lot of things, but it mainly drains 
resources from the state. It lowers people’s expectations of what they can do 
for themselves and what their government will do for them. I also think that 
sometimes we make too much out of corruption. When I and other instructors 
from the Center for Civil-Military Relations have worked in Africa over the 
last 15 or 16 years, facilitating programs throughout the continent, we don’t ever 
bring up the “C” word. This doesn’t mean corruption doesn’t get talked about, 
because our participants will generally bring it up, but I think corruption as we 
Americans understand it is one thing, while the Africans see it as another thing. 
It is how “Africa Works.” 6 It’s an ingrained process that has to do with the system 
of clientele-ism that has developed over the years. It’s not as black-and-white an 
issue as we [non-Africans] would often like to portray it. Corruption certainly 
does drain resources, and it really becomes a problem when the state runs out of 
the resources it needs to fulfill its role as the patron and take care of its respon-
sibilities to its clients. When those in power run out of their own money to do 
this, they use the state’s money, and when the state runs out of money, then other 
issues such as political instability, public dissatisfaction, civil disobedience, and 
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Opposite: (top) students attend class at a public school in Bamako, Mali; (bottom) a vendor in Yaounde, Cameroon.
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public unrest can arise and pose a threat to security. If we could create jobs for 
some of these folks, then economic development would be part of an answer to 
the problem of corruption. Executive and legislative impunity in Africa is also a 
factor in this discussion. It’s difficult to hold people accountable. 
LAWSON: In Nigeria, as an example, it seems there is a very direct correla-
tion between corruption and terrorism and counterterrorism. If you look at the 
ideology of Boko Haram, especially in its early days, one of the things that has 
motivated the group is the lack of justice in Nigeria. Even their name, which they 
didn’t choose, reflects this. The community started calling them boko haram as a 
way of making fun of them, actually. Boko is the [Hausa] word for book, which 
is associated with Western education, and haram means forbidden. Leaders 
of Boko Haram associate Western education with access to elite positions. In 
their view, this leads to systemic inequality: some people become very well off 
through corruption, while others have nothing. So in Nigeria in particular, the 
inequality and injustice that flow from corruption are actually key elements of 
the terrorists’ ideology. 
But I think it’s also important to recognize that corruption is not limited to the 
state, and within the state apparatus, it is not centralized. That means it’s difficult 
for the state to reform itself because corruption is so pervasive. Even lower-level 
employees have not really bought into this effort to reform and address these 
issues at all levels. I think it’s a really complicated issue to deal with, which is the 
main reason why we don’t bring it up in our courses. If you poll Africans, they 
say corruption is their biggest problem. But when individuals are involved in re-
ciprocal arrangements, it doesn’t seem so much like corruption to them; it seems 
more like corruption when somebody else is involved. Again, this is driven by 
the fact that there are not enough resources for anything. How to you distribute 
scarce resources? They tend to get distributed through patronage networks, so if 
you are outside of the network, obviously the whole thing looks illegitimate. But 
what is the alternative? How else do governments hold their countries together 
in this context of resource scarcity and institutional weakness? 
One of the biggest obstacles for the Nigerian government and the Nigerian 
security forces in dealing with Boko Haram is that people don’t trust the 
government or security forces any more than they trust Boko Haram. This is also 
a problem of corruption, as is the inadequacy of the security forces’ equipment. 
The ongoing trials of high-level officials for corruption related to the theft of 
resources intended for the counterinsurgency campaign are evidence of this 
problem. I think this is another thing that can eventually bring benefit: when 
the threat gets high enough that people take it seriously, maybe we can start to 
work on resolving some of those issues. But it’s a very long-term agenda, and it’s 
very directly related to economic development. There is no country in the world 
that has reduced patronage significantly before developing a capitalist economy. 
That’s just the reality, because resources are scarce and there is no middle class. So 
I think you have to work on everything at the same time, to an extent sufficient 
to rally the population and gain their confidence. If even a little improvement 
in the effectiveness of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency buys you some 
popular support, you can build on that by encouraging people to trust more in 
Opposite:  a man washes a car at an outdoor carwash in the Asokoro section of Abuja, Nigeria.
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government and to help the government. Counterterrorism is not a government 
activity. Everybody has to be engaged, because the security services have to be 
able to get intelligence from the people. 
MENSCH: Corruption can divert funds that were intended for development 
to other purposes, into people’s pockets or wherever. Because donors recognize 
that, there has been a shift from direct budgetary assistance to governments to 
routing funds through the NGO community and civil society organizations. That 
was heralded as a positive development that would enable donors to track and 
get better use from and accountability for the donated funds. But just as logic 
would tell you, we now see that some civil society organizations have become 
part of the problem as well as part of the solution. Such organizations compete 
for resources, especially at the national or local level. The fact that each time we 
try to address this with development assistance the basic economic situation 
does not change should tell us something. Needy people will find a way to access 
the resources, and patronage has implications for both the people who have 
and the people who do not have. Clearly, corruption is going to be with us for a 
while. A few countries have tried to develop effective anticorruption organiza-
tions and plans. If they are really effective, they run into problems, not just with 
government, as Letitia said, but with other organizations, the business com-
munity, contractors, and so on. Until the basics of the economy and governance 
improve, I think this is just going to be a fact of life, which does not mean that 
we should not try to fight against the problem. 
TOMB: What is the state of defense institutions in African countries? Is the US 
Congress right to focus on strengthening management and oversight of African 
armed forces, alongside more traditional train-and-equip programs?
MENSCH: Yes, I think we are right to focus on management of the force, 
national security planning, institutional development, defense ministry capacity, 
professionalism, and so on. We have also identified some weaknesses in our train-
and-equip methodology in Africa in the last five or 10 years. Building the defense 
institution within a country is an important step, but you can’t wait to train and 
equip the armed forces while you are building the defense institutions; you have 
to be able to do them both simultaneously, which is not necessarily easy. But I 
question the US approach. We go to the Liberian defense minister’s office, for 
example, and tell him, “Oh, hi, we’re from the United States government, and 
we’re here to help you clean up your ministry.” This is not a good approach to 
take with almost any of these governments. We develop these ideas about how 
we need to do this or that in Africa, without consulting our African partners. 
We don’t ask, “Mr. Minister, how can we help you strengthen your efficiency, 
your productivity, the professionalism of your ministry? How can we help you 
exercise objective control over your armed forces? What are your priorities?” We 
don’t do that. We come in with an idea and say, “Here is our idea. Do it.” Then 
we wonder why the ministries drag their feet in implementation. They don’t 
want to say no to a gift horse, but they clearly don’t have their heart in some of 
these initiatives because they are not their initiatives, they are ours. I think that’s 
an inherent problem with the approach that we take. For example, a worthwhile 
but ambitious effort to help the DRC prepare for local and presidential elections 
in 2016 was canceled by the host government when it realized that participants 
Opposite: (top) a cell phone vendor in Yaounde, Cameroon; (bottom) three boys in the Asokoro section of Abuja, Nigeria.
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were raising issues that the central government did not 
want raised. Intelligence officials were sent to stop the 
seminars that were already in progress, and the US facilita-
tors were told to leave the country. The government of 
the DRC had only reluctantly and vaguely approved this 
program—after it had already begun—under pressure 
from the US government. Unless the host governments 
want US assistance at least as much the United States 
wants to provide it, neither the host government’s nor the 
US government’s interests will be served.
LAWSON: We absolutely have to follow. There is no 
way we can lead. So if we identify a country in which the 
government is seriously interested in institution building, 
I think we can be of assistance. I would add that there actu-
ally always is civilian oversight of the military in Africa; 
often there is too much, not too little. The problem is that 
it is not formally institutionalized. These governments 
work through personal networks, so institutions are going 
to be personalized. When we show up to say, “We are here 
to help you build institutional capacity,” it’s not just that 
they are not paying attention. They actually don’t want 
it, because the way they control their security forces is 
through personal networks. 
This is an important thing to emphasize. In countries 
where we perceive a direct threat to our interests and need 
partners to address it, we don’t push our agendas. Are we 
running out to Ethiopia, for example, to say we are there 
to help them build their democratic institutions? I don’t 
think so. We let them work the way they want to because 
that works for us. In places like Liberia, by contrast, we 
show up to say, “We are here to help you build an institu-
tion!” because there aren’t any real threats to US interests in 
Liberia. When we don’t have real threats, we fall back on 
institution building and democratization and all of these 
lofty sorts of goals that we set aside when we do have real 
security interests. We have to think about these questions 
from the perspective of African governments. Controlling 
the military is always serious for them. There is evidence 
that Nigeria is seriously interested in institutionalizing 
civilian control because of the recognition that the security 
forces need to be more effective than they are. But again, 
I think we can help only where a government has decided 
that this is a priority for them.
TOMB: Thank you both.  ²
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Whenever I have attempted to teach the concept of prin-
cipled ethics in a class or at a briefing over the past eight years, I have asked those 
present to consider whether they hold any principle to be so fundamental to 
who they are that they are willing to “go to the mat” over it—to uphold it, even 
in the face of anguish and hardship for themselves or someone else. And almost 
every time I’ve asked this question, the reaction from the majority of those 
present has been “No.”  
Before we go further, keep in mind two things: First, I typically ask this ques-
tion of young, seasoned, professionally dedicated, often combat-tested indi-
viduals from law enforcement and the military, whose core task is to defeat the 
evils of terrorism. These are people who have taken at least one oath, and often 
more, to protect and defend a country, a constitution, a citizenry. But invariably, 
the overwhelming majority of them regard personal ethics as a shifting calculus, 
a product of an ever-present consequential calculation. And second, although 
I’m disappointed at the tally, I’m honestly no longer surprised. 
I recognize that the majority of the people sitting before me when I ask this 
question may never have considered the issue of principled ethics. It’s likely that 
their ethics training up until now has been based on an amalgam of vague pre-
cepts: don’t screw up, do what’s right, don’t embarrass the organization. And it’s 
equally likely that for them a simple utilitarian calculation—find the resolution 
that provides the greatest benefit to those involved (however “those involved” is 
defined)—has served them extremely well. I understand that. But I also think of 
Stuart Herrington.
The story of Captain Herrington is one of many stories depicted in the 2014 
documentary film, Last Days in Vietnam.1 Herrington was an American intel-
ligence officer stationed at the US Embassy in Saigon in April 1975, during the 
final weeks of the Vietnam War. Although the invading North Vietnamese forces 
were driving south toward Saigon and the South Vietnamese army had already 
begun to collapse under the weight of the North’s advance, US Ambassador 
Graham Martin refused to authorize a plan for the systematic evacuation of the 
approximately 5,000 American personnel who remained in-country. Many of 
those personnel were involved with, or married to, South Vietnamese nationals, 
and some had families in Saigon. Martin similarly refused to authorize even the 
development of any plan to remove those South Vietnamese military leaders, 
officials, and locals who, once the Northern forces arrived, would be at high risk 
of execution because of their cooperation with the Americans.
Herrington fully grasped the imminent danger to those South Vietnamese 
officials and others with whom he had directly worked. In clear defiance of the 
approved American embassy evacuation plan, which forbid the evacuation of 
South Vietnamese nationals, and also in direct violation of Vietnamese law, 
which specifically stated that South Vietnamese military officials were not to be 
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evacuated, Herrington and other American servicemen began to organize “black 
operations” to smuggle high-risk South Vietnamese military friends, officials, 
and associates out of the country through unauthorized airlifts on empty cargo 
planes. According to former CIA analyst Frank Snepp, who was stationed in 
Saigon at the time, the airlifts were “makeshift, ‘underground railway’ evacua-
tions using outgoing cargo aircraft that would be totally below the radar of the 
ambassador.”2 Herrington chose to act because the South Vietnamese officials 
and military officers whom he evacuated were, realistically speaking, “dead men 
walking.” Yet, had these unauthorized evacuations ever been detected, he and the 
others who were involved would have been “run out of country, end of career!” 
Herrington himself explains his decision in the film, “But sometimes there’s an 
issue not of legal or illegal but of right or wrong.” In other words, Herrington 
was driven by an ethical principle. In defiance of both a written directive that 
specifically forbade the evacuations and the peril to his career, he chose to save 
the lives of his South Vietnamese military colleagues and their families.
Do I think Stuart Herrington acted ethically in ignoring both the clear inten-
tions of the ambassador and the written directive? Yes, I do—an answer that 
should come as no surprise to regular readers of my columns. In recent issues 
of CTX, I wrote about individuals such as Belgian Army Captain Luc Lemaire 
and Swiss border officer Paul Grüninger, who faced similar circumstances.3 The 
documentary Last Days in Vietnam also highlights other American servicemen 
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and diplomats who made similar decisions to save South Vietnamese nationals, 
but what makes the case of Stuart Herrington so compelling for me is that he 
was driven by the principle to do right by those who had stood beside him and 
put their own lives on the line in the mutual struggle to preserve South Vietnam. 
Herrington clearly knew the risks he was taking, but he also knew he had both 
the opportunity and the means to save those directly in his sphere of influence 
from imminent execution. Given that opportunity and those means, he chose to 
act on his principles.
What’s in a Principle?
The case of Stuart Herrington nevertheless raises two concerns about the 
dangers of acting on a principle. The first concern is that it’s not enough simply 
to possess a principle. Anyone can have a principle: even the villainous Joker 
and Penguin characters from the Batman comic books possess principles, albeit 
profoundly duplicitous, self-serving ones.4 And merely calling a favorite concept 
or belief a principle doesn’t automatically ensure that it is founded on a bedrock 
of morals or ethics. In that regard, as one measure of whether a principle is 
ethically justifiable, I recommend the first part of Emmanuel Kant’s categorical 
imperative, in which he suggests that one’s actions—presumably as an extension 
of one’s will—should always be fit to serve as a maxim or guide for others.5 In 
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other words, I should act in a way that I believe would 
serve as an example of right behavior for everyone else in 
the world.  
Kant can be perceived to be unyielding in this dictum, 
as with, for example, his insistence on never telling a 
lie regardless of the circumstances. And the burden of 
always acting as a model for future decision makers can 
be ponderous, to say the least. But the notion of basing a 
principle on an action you’d want everyone else to emulate 
in their own lives seems sound to me, and I suspect that 
Herrington and many of the other Americans in Saigon at 
the time felt the same way.
Still another time-tested guidepost for the ethical sound-
ness of a principle may be Rushworth Kidder’s care-based 
resolution principle, which he acknowledges is nothing 
more than the Golden Rule (do to others as you would 
have them do to you), a guide that “not only sets limits on 
our actions, but encourages us to promote the interests of 
others.” 6 Again, I think Captain Her-
rington would agree, especially as he 
imagined himself in the shoes of those 
South Vietnamese servicemen and their 
families, facing the impending arrival 
of the North Vietnamese forces. And 
while Kidder acknowledges that the 
Golden Rule tends to be dismissed by 
both weighty earlier philosophers such 
as Kant and contemporary ones such as 
Sissela Bok,7 it appears in some form as a 
moral precept of Christianity, Judaism, 
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, 
Zoroastrianism, and the rest of the major religions.8 In that 
light, the Golden Rule is probably not a bad guidepost by 
which to measure an ethical principle.
The Cost of Turning Away
The case of Captain Herrington illustrates a second 
concern for me, as well: ethical principles can not only be 
tough to cling to in times that test character, but they can 
also be scarring to abandon. 
The end of Last Days in Vietnam depicts the final hours 
of the American embassy in Saigon, 29–30 April 1975, as 
approximately 1,100 South Vietnamese men, women, and 
children wait in darkness inside the embassy grounds, 
hoping to be airlifted to safety before the North Viet-
namese forces reach them.9 Herrington approaches the 
crowd and promises them that they will all be safely evacu-
ated. He further assures them that being on the embassy 
grounds signifies that they are already within the safety 
and protection of the United States. Hours later, however, 
after 680 of the 1,100 assembled Vietnamese nationals have 
been evacuated, an order from US President Gerald Ford 
ends the airlifts, and Herrington is tasked with keeping 
the remaining 420 South Vietnamese “warm”—that is, 
to mollify and deceive them into staying calm so that he 
and the rest of the embassy staff can exit to the roof and 
be airlifted on the final flight out of the city. Or to put it 
another way, Stuart Herrington, who earlier in the month 
risked his career to airlift his South Vietnamese colleagues 
and their families to safety and who hours earlier had 
promised the remaining nationals that they would be 
protected and evacuated as well, is now ordered to lie to 
those same people so that they will remain passive while 
being abandoned. And Herrington does his job.
He walks over to the remaining 420 South Vietnamese 
and tells them a “big helicopter is about to come.” Then 
after waiting a moment, he excuses himself, walks a circu-
itous route back into the embassy, and 
climbs to the roof. In a later interview, 
Herrington confesses that the entire 
situation, including the way he broke 
his personal promise to those waiting 
outside, “really, really was wrong,” 
and he admits that he considered for 
a moment remaining at the embassy 
until his promise was fulfilled. Still, he 
boarded the helicopter and remembers 
looking down though the open door 
at those 420 people waiting quietly on 
the grounds where he left them. “I felt 
absolutely awful,” he confides. “It was so severe and deep 
a betrayal.” And by that he means, I assume, not only a 
betrayal of the people below, but of himself. 
I’ve seen this film several times, and I have always inferred 
that Herrington struggled with the fact that he deliberately 
broke his promise to those people and abandoned them 
to whatever fate they would encounter under the North 
Vietnamese. I suspect in his world—of military discipline 
and the military code of honor—one does not readily 
abandon either a principle or a promise made when there 
are human lives potentially on the line, and I fully believe 
that for him the reconciliation of that broken promise and 
its consequences has not come easily.
Having said that, when I consider his two decisions—first 
to organize “black ops” to evacuate South Vietnamese 
colleagues at the risk of his military career, and second to 
lie and abandon other South Vietnamese when the peril 
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was imminent—it occurs to me that the circumstances 
surrounding the two decisions were significantly different. 
In early April 1975, Herrington had the three necessary 
conditions of time, opportunity, and means by which to 
act upon his principle to help protect those individuals 
who had worked closely with him in a common cause. In 
the final hours of the embassy evacuation, he had none 
of those conditions to call upon. At the moment of his 
promise to the 1,100 people on the embassy grounds that 
they would all be airlifted to safety, there is no reason to 
doubt that Herrington believed that the time, opportunity, 
and means to fulfill that promise still held, just as they had 
up until then. But in the intervening hours between his 
promise and the eventual direction by his superior to go 
downstairs and make the remaining 420 “warm,” decision 
makers far removed from the reality of the embassy grounds 
that night canceled all three of the necessary conditions 
for Herrington’s promise to remain viable. He was thus left 
with few choices other than to betray those to whom he 
had promised safety and protection only hours earlier.  
To his credit, Herrington did consider refusing to leave 
until the remaining 420 South Vietnamese were evacuated 
as he had promised. But he also realized that, by that time, 
it was too late to get anyone else out. His superiors had 
made the decision to end the airlift. Furthermore, there 
was the danger that if he told the crowd the truth, they 
were likely to panic and delay his own departure, and risk 
allowing the North Vietnamese troops to start targeting 
the evacuation helicopters.10 
In today’s parlance, it’s possible that Stuart Herrington 
suffered a “moral injury”—what Dr. Bill Nash, a leading 
authority on the subject, would describe as the ancient idea 
“that people can be damaged in the cores of their personhood 
by life experiences that violently contradict deeply held, and 
deeply necessary, beliefs about themselves and the world.”11 
Such is the price we may pay for possessing strong ethical 
principles and encountering experiences that challenge and 
occasionally overwhelm our ability to honor them.
Despite his decision that day in 1975, I admire what Her-
rington and his fellow “black-ops” conspirators did to help 
those whom they could help. I admire the fact that he acted 
on an ethical principle. I also admire the fact that almost 40 
years later, he is still grappling with the memory of his ac-
tions on the embassy grounds that night and is attempting 
to reconcile them with those “deeply held, and deeply 
necessary, beliefs” about himself and the world. I believe, 
simply, that true ethical principles rooted in sound, morally 
justifiable soil are important. I further believe that indi-
viduals who possess such principles and have had to pay the 
price for them offer the rest of us a possible model for how 
we ourselves should act when we are put to the test. ²  
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Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in 
Access-Denied Environments  
by Robert Haddick
In this monograph, Robert Haddick examines a variety of emerging technolo-
gies and techniques that could improve the sustainment and effectiveness of 
distributed SOF operations, especially in access-denied environments. He begins 
by presenting a challenging yet plausible notional unconventional warfare 
campaign scenario. He describes how current SOF planners would attempt to 
cope with this scenario under current doctrine and sustainment capabilities, 
and explores current and emerging technologies that could provide new options 
and capabilities. Finally, he evaluates new technologies that promise to reduce 
logistic demand for distributed SOF operations. Haddick proposes research and 
development projects that would provide SOF with capabilities that improve 
their capacity to execute clandestine UW campaigns in denied areas. This mono-
graph helps close the gap between current conditions and what will be necessary 
in an access-denied future. 
These recent JSOU Press publications are available electronically in the JSOU Library Management System: 
https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications
Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams  
by William Knarr, Jessica Glicken Turnley, Dona J. Stewart, Rich 
Rubright, and Jason Quirin
On 24 January 2013, the US secretary of defense (SecDef ) rescinded the 1994 
Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DCAR), which 
excluded women from assignment to units and positions whose primary mission 
is to engage in direct combat on the ground. In doing so, the SecDef directed the 
opening of all occupational specialties, positions, and units to women; the vali-
dation of gender-neutral standards for those positions; and the establishment of 
milestones for implementation. In a March 2013 memorandum, the Commander 
USSOCOM directed several initiatives as a result of the SecDef ’s DCAR rescission. 
While other studies examined individual performance and standards, the JSOU 
Center for Special Operations Studies and Research examined the effects of 
these changes on team dynamics. The challenge for this study was to determine 
whether changing the gender component of special operations forces elite teams 
from single-gender (masculine) to mixed-gender would affect team dynamics in 
a way that would compromise the ability of the team to meet a mission objective.
Joint Special Operations University
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MacDill AFB FL 33621
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Rethinking Special Operations Leadership: 
Process, Persuasion, Pre-existing, and Personality  
by Paul S. Lieber
In this paper, Dr. Lieber describes leadership characteristics through the lens 
of special operations. By exploring the importance of process, persuasion, 
pre-existing schemata, and personality nuances on special operations leadership 
training and execution, along with additional traits or characteristics necessary 
for success, Dr. Lieber looks beyond the traditional definitions of military 
leadership. The first section explores process and adaptation to innovation. 
Organizations must innovate, but it is the leader’s responsibility to make certain 
that innovation is both appropriate and matched to an established goal. The next 
section studies the leader’s power of persuasion and the ability to nuance mes-
saging and influence desirable opinions and consensus building. The third part 
explores pre-existing schemata and provides recommendations to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. In the final section, Dr. Lieber takes a look at how personality dif-
ferences can affect and enhance teams that are composed of diverse personality 
types. Dr. Lieber is an award-winning scholar and practitioner in the field of 
global strategic communication. Currently a resident senior fellow at JSOU, he 
previously served as the command writer for two USSOCOM commanders. 
SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime  
edited by William Mendel and Peter McCabe
In April 2015, military and civilian personnel from Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States came together at Colorado Springs, Colorado, for a symposium 
hosted by US Special Operations Command-North and facilitated by Joint Spe-
cial Operations University and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. 
Their task was to examine the role of SOF in combating transnational organized 
crime (TOC). The panelists and plenary participants considered a wide range 
of issues related to the TOC threat. After the symposium concluded, panelists 
and speakers synthesized the results of their research and panel discussions into 
articles for publication. Those articles are found in the chapters of this proceed-
ings report. The implication for SOF is that they must continue to train to meet 
the strategic challenges ahead. This will require forward-deployed units that are 
engaged with their counterparts in host countries because TOC is both a threat 
to, and a result of, weak, emerging democratic governments. These governments 
can benefit from engagement. Readiness to conduct all SOF core activities will 
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Joint Special Operations University Press
Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CAN-
SOFCOM) was stood up in February 2006 to provide the 
necessary focus and oversight for all Canadian Special 
Operations Forces. This initiative has ensured that the 
Government of Canada has the best possible integrated, 
led, and trained Special Operations Forces at its disposal.
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is located at 
MacDill AFB, Florida, on the Pinewood Campus. JSOU was 
activated in September 2000 as USSOCOM’s joint educa-
tional element. USSOCOM, a global combatant command, 
synchronizes the planning of Special Operations and 
provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 
networked, and distributed Global Combatant Command 
operations in order to protect and advance our Nation’s 
interests.
Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) is a 
subordinate unified command of U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) under the operational control of 
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).  SOCNORTH 
enhances command and control of special operations 
forces throughout the USNORTHCOM area of responsi-
bility. SOCNORTH also improves DOD capability support 
to interagency counterterrorism operations.
jsou.socom.mil
“…the threat to our nations’ security demands that we… 
determine the potential SOF roles for countering and  
diminishing these violent destabilizing networks.” 
Rear Admiral Kerry Metz
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The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s Undoing  
by Jarret Brachman
In this monograph, Dr. Brachman delves into al Qaeda’s crumbling global move-
ment and its internal struggles, including its attempts to remain relevant in the 
shadow of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Brachman cites various 
internal writings of al Qaeda’s past and present leaders, thinkers, and supporters. 
It becomes clear that this once dominant terrorist organization has changed 
in the post-bin Laden era, becoming fractured and taking a backseat to ISIL. 
Brachman analyzes letters, blog posts, and social media comments from various 
ranks within al Qaeda that show the discontent, frustration, and confusion the 
once prominent terrorist organization has faced in recent years. Although strug-
gling, al Qaeda remains a serious threat and maintains a global footprint. But as 
ISIL gains more publicity, al Qaeda has more trouble competing for followers, 
funding, and attention. This monograph explores al Qaeda’s recent efforts to 
make sense of itself. 
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